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DEFERENCE OR DESTRUCTION? 
REINING IN THE NOERR-PENNINGTON 
AND STATE ACTION DOCTRINES 
Karen Roche* 
This Article focuses on two limits to federal antitrust law—the Noerr-
Pennington and state action doctrines. These doctrines aim to balance 
the right to petition and the independent sovereignty of the states with 
the goals of antitrust law. Therefore, these doctrines protect petitioning 
and state action from liability, even where such action is 
anticompetitive in nature or motive and thwarts the goals of the 
antitrust laws. While it seems clear that these two exceptions to federal 
antitrust law are rooted in the First Amendment and federalism, the 
Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the sources or extent of the 
doctrines. Because of this, the doctrines are far broader than is 
necessary to give deference to these principles. This Article examines 
the harm that these overly broad exceptions cause consumers and 
proposes that the Court narrow the doctrines by tailoring them to what 
is required by the First Amendment and federalism. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., May 2010, 
University of San Diego. I would like to express my gratitude to Whitney Chelgren for her 
guidance, support, and keen eye for editing. I would also like to thank Professor Lazaroff for his 
insight and the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their tireless efforts. 
Most importantly, I would like to thank my family and friends, especially my father, for the 
countless hours he spent helping and inspiring me, and Jonathan Sandler and James Payer, for 
being my law-school support system. 
  
1296 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1295 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1298 
II.  BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 1302 
A.  The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine .................................... 1303 
1.  Genesis of the Noerr Doctrine ................................. 1303 
2.  The Court Used the Canon of Constitutional 
Avoidance in Creating the Noerr Doctrine .............. 1304 
3.  Limitations of Noerr Immunity: The Sham 
Exception ................................................................. 1305 
4.  Limiting the Limitation: Narrowing the Sham 
Exception ................................................................. 1307 
5.  Other Limitations of Noerr: Exceptions for Fraud .. 1308 
B.  The State Action Doctrine ............................................. 1309 
1.  Evolution of the State Action Doctrine .................... 1310 
2.  Expansions of State Action Immunity ..................... 1316 
III.  CRITIQUE ................................................................................. 1318 
A.  The Court Misinterpreted the Sherman Act by Using 
the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance ........................ 1318 
B.  The Noerr Court’s Failure to Recognize a Conflict 
Between Antitrust Law and the First Amendment in 
Has Resulted in an Excessively Broad Immunity ......... 1319 
1.  Is the Sham Exception Itself a Sham?...................... 1321 
a.  The PRE test raises the bar too high and fails to 
protect the consumer .......................................... 1321 
b.  The subjective intent requirement swallows the 
sham exception .................................................. 1324 
c.  Sham immunizes antitrust defendants that can 
afford to pay for protection ................................ 1325 
2.  The Lack of a Misrepresentation Exception 
Undermines the Democratic Process ....................... 1327 
C.  The Parker Court’s Failure to Recognize the Conflict 
Between Antitrust Laws and Federalism Principles 
Has Left State Action Essentially Unregulated ............ 1328 
1.  Midcal Foreseeability............................................... 1329 
2.  Active Supervision ................................................... 1330 
  
Summer 2012] DEFERENCE OR DESTRUCTION? 1297 
 
a.  Unclear standard requires courts to make 
subjective determination about what is 
sufficient ............................................................ 1330 
b.  Misguided faith in municipalities ....................... 1331 
c.  Exemption of regulatory agencies from active 
supervision broadens state action beyond its 
intended purpose ................................................ 1333 
3.  Market Participant Exception .................................. 1335 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................ 1336 
A.  Narrowing Noerr and Bringing It Within the 
Parameters of the First Amendment ............................. 1337 
1.  The Court Should Clearly Define “Petition” ........... 1337 
2.  The Court Should Adopt First Amendment 
Limitations ............................................................... 1338 
a.  The Court should create an exception for fraud 
and intentional misrepresentations .................... 1339 
b.  Intentional misrepresentations should not be 
immunized in any context.................................. 1340 
3.  Broadening Sham to Protect the Consumer ............. 1341 
B.  Narrowing the State Action Doctrine and Aligning It 
with the Principles of Federalism ................................. 1343 
1.  Narrowing the Doctrine by Strengthening the Clear 
Articulation Standard ............................................... 1343 
2.  Narrowing the State Action Doctrine by 
Strengthening the Active Supervision Requirement 1345 
3.  Implementing Market Participant and Conspiracy 
Exceptions ............................................................... 1347 
V.  CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 1349 
 
  
  
1298 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1295 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1890, in reaction to the public outrage at nineteenth century 
economic giants, Congress enacted the Sherman Antitrust Act (the 
“Sherman Act” or the “Act”) in an effort to curb the unethical 
political and economic forces behind monopolies.
1
 The Act prohibits 
any trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce and makes it 
a felony to monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of 
interstate trade or commerce.
2
 The purpose of the Act was, and still 
is, to promote competition for the benefit of the consumer.
3
 Because 
competitive prices and quality resources protect the consumer, 
antitrust laws restrict conduct that harms efficiency by raising prices 
above—or driving quality or output below—the competitive level.
4
 
Since 1890, the enforcement of antitrust laws and the laws 
themselves have changed with the economic, political, and social 
climate.
5
 While protecting the consumer remains the goal of the 
antitrust laws, the structures used to achieve this end have varied.
6
 
These laws have been viewed both narrowly and expansively to 
match the climate of the era.
7
 But, however one views substantive 
 
 1. Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundations of Noerr-Pennington and the Burden of Proving 
Sham Petitioning: The Historical-Constitutional Argument in Favor of a “Clear and 
Convincing” Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 681, 696 (1994). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (The Sherman 
Act “directs itself . . . against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition . . . out of 
concern for the public interest.”); Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 988 
(9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the “central purpose” of the antitrust laws is to preserve competition 
in order to benefit consumers); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“The primary goal of antitrust law is to maximize consumer welfare by promoting 
competition among firms.”); Assoc. of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris Inc., 79 F. Supp. 
2d 1219, 1223 (W.D. Wash. 1999), aff’d, 241 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Antitrust laws are only 
intended to preserve competition for the benefit of consumers.”). 
 4. Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 5. See 1 JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION 
§ 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-2 (2d ed. 2011). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.; see also Diana De Leon, The Judicial Contraction of Section 2 Doctrine, 45 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1105 (2012) (arguing that two recent Supreme Court cases have narrowed the scope 
of liability for Section 2 monopoly violations involving unilateral firm conduct, to the detriment 
of competition and consumers); Allen G. Haroutounian, Shedding Light on the Federal Courts' 
Treatment of Horizontal Restraints Under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 45 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 1173 (2012) (discussing how the court has moved from the per se approach to the rule of 
reason approach when analyzing horizontal restraints); Nicole McGuire, An Antitrust Narcotic: 
How the Rule of Reason Is Lulling Vertical Enforcement to Sleep, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225 
(2012) (focusing on how the rule of reason has overtaken the per se standard as the only analysis 
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antitrust law, there are certain areas in which antitrust law does not 
apply.
8
 Both the judiciary and the legislature have recognized these 
areas, which create exceptions to the general consumer-protection 
policy of antitrust law.
9
 These exceptions aim to give deference to 
competing policies that conflict with antitrust laws.
10
 This Article 
focuses on two such limits—the Noerr-Pennington
11
 and state action 
doctrines. Respectively, these doctrines shield citizen petitioning and 
state action from the reach of antitrust law.
12
 The U.S. Constitution 
and the structure of the federal government protect the independent 
sovereignty of the states
13
 and the right of all citizens to petition the 
government.
14
 The Noerr-Pennington and state action doctrines aim 
to balance these core principles with the goals of antitrust law.
15
 
Therefore, under these doctrines, petitioning and state action will not 
give rise to liability, even where such action is anticompetitive in 
nature or motive
16
 and thwarts the goals of antitrust law.
17
 
 
in vertical restraint cases and arguing that the rule of reason operates as a default rule of per se 
legality); Marleina Paz, Almost But Not Quite Perfect: The Past, Present, and Potential Future of 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1045 (2012) (arguing that the Obama 
Administration has appropriately been more aggressive in challenging horizontal mergers than the 
Bush administration). 
 8. 3 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 5, § 47.01, at 47-1. 
 9. Id. at 47-7 to 47-9. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The doctrine takes its name from the two cases that created it: Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine 
Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). This Article will use the terms Noerr-
Pennington and Noerr to refer to the doctrine . 
 12. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138; Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
 13. The Constitution reflects the balance between state and federal sovereignty. The 
Supremacy clause makes the laws of the United States the supreme law of the land, U.S. CONST. 
art. VI, cl. 2, while the Tenth Amendment dictates that powers not delegated to the federal 
government are reserved to the states. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the 
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 15. As a constitutional guarantee, the right to petition deserves deference from all other laws 
and policies. Although “[a]s a charter of freedom, the Sherman Act has a generality and 
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions[,]” the Sherman 
Act is “perhaps unfortunately” not a constitutional provision. Faulkner, supra note 1, at 689 & 
n.62 (citing Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933)). 
 16. Black’s Law Dictionary defines anticompetitive conduct as “[a]n act that harms or seeks 
to harm the market or the process of competition among businesses, and that has no legitimate 
business purpose.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 109 (9th ed. 2009); see also Broadcom Corp. v. 
Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 2007) (defining anticompetitive conduct 
“generally . . . as conduct to obtain or maintain monopoly power as a result of competition on 
some basis other than the merits. Conduct that impairs the opportunities of rivals and either does 
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While it seems clear that these two exceptions to federal 
antitrust law are rooted in the First Amendment and federalism, the 
Supreme Court has failed to clearly delineate the precise sources or 
extent of the doctrines.
18
 This failure has left the lower courts 
without a clear standard to apply in cases where these protected 
rights conflict with antitrust law.
19
 When the Supreme Court carved 
out these exceptions to antitrust liability, it relied on the Sherman Act 
as the source of the immunities.
20
 The Court held that it was 
excluding from antitrust liability activities that it found to be beyond 
the intended scope of antitrust laws. In doing so, the Court read the 
Sherman Act in a way that altogether avoided the conflict between 
antitrust law on one hand and the First Amendment and federalism 
on the other.
21
 For example, in Noerr, the Court held that a petition 
to the government was not the type of agreement in restraint of trade 
that the Sherman Act was meant to prevent.
22
 The Court explained 
that the Sherman Act is meant to regulate business activity, not 
political activity.
23
 Similarly, in Parker, the case that created the 
state action doctrine,
24
 the Court held that there was nothing in the 
language of the Sherman Act that was intended to prohibit a state 
from exercising its own regulatory authority.
25
 Although the Court 
ultimately found that the Sherman Act simply did not apply in these 
contexts, the decisions themselves and later opinions indicate that the 
Noerr and Parker holdings were influenced by the Court’s concern 
 
not further competition on the merits, or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way may be 
deemed anticompetitive”). 
 17. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136; Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. 
 18. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136–37; Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51. 
 21. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137; Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. 
 22. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 136–37. 
 23. Id. at 137 (explaining that imposing liability on those petitioning the government “would 
impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political activity, a 
purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act”). 
 24. Parker, 317 U.S. at 341. While Parker is generally recognized as the case that created 
the state action doctrine in its current form, some scholars have argued that this is a 
misconception, and that the doctrine can be traced to decisions prior to Parker, such as Olsen v. 
Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904). Milton Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State 
Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1976). 
 25. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51. 
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for First Amendment rights and the principles of federalism.
26
 The 
antitrust immunities, therefore, were born from a desire to avoid a 
conflict between antitrust laws and the First Amendment and 
principles of federalism. 
However, the goals of antitrust law are not only different from 
but are also often inconsistent with the goals of the First Amendment 
and federalism.
27
 While reading the Sherman Act to avoid this 
conflict has appeal in its simplicity, it fails to recognize, grapple 
with, and adequately resolve how to balance the important statutory 
objective of protecting consumers with the need to preserve First 
Amendment rights and the principles of federalism. Antitrust laws 
exist to preserve economic freedom and the right to compete, and 
while they may sometimes be in conflict with the First Amendment 
and the principles of federalism, the freedoms they protect are no less 
important than those protected by the Constitution and the United 
States’ system of government.
28
 This Article will argue that, by 
concluding that Congress never intended for antitrust law to regulate 
in these areas, the Court gave undue deference to the First 
Amendment and federalism. In doing so, the Court immunized 
conduct that should be regulated because without regulation there is 
nothing to stop anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to the 
consumer. In order to allow antitrust laws to properly curb this 
anticompetitive behavior, as well as to produce clear guidance in this 
area for the lower courts, the Court must reassess these doctrines and 
more effectively balance the goals of antitrust law with First 
 
 26. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138 (“The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the 
Bill of Rights, and we cannot, of course, lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade these 
freedoms.”); Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. 
 27. See David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and 
Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 295–96 
(1994) (“One of the ways a firm can compete is by asking the government to confer a benefit on 
the firm or to impose a burden on its competitors. Firms compete in this political ‘market’ for 
economic benefits they cannot otherwise get in economic markets. . . . Companies that turn to the 
political markets to gain a competitive advantage almost always do so in order to achieve an 
anticompetitive result. If they could achieve the same result legally in the market—through 
innovation or more efficient management, for example—the company would do so and save the 
costs of transacting with the government.”). 
 28. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (“Antitrust laws . . . are as 
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of 
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed 
each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with vigor, 
imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.”). 
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Amendment and federalism concerns. Instead of construing antitrust 
law to avoid the conflict, the Court should articulate a policy that 
enables the lower courts to effectively and fairly balance these 
competing goals. The Supreme Court must narrow the application of 
these exceptions in a manner that will not only continue to protect 
First Amendment rights and federalism but will also allow antitrust 
law to serve its purpose—protecting the consumer. 
Part II of this Article will discuss the development of the Noerr-
Pennington and state action doctrines. It will look at the Supreme 
Court cases that have shaped the two doctrines and will discuss the 
contours of the doctrines as they exist today. Part III will 
demonstrate how the Supreme Court has construed the Sherman Act 
as separate from and inconsistent with the goals of Noerr and Parker. 
It will then argue that this construction both has created 
unnecessarily broad immunities—which leaves unregulated areas of 
activity that need antitrust supervision—and has left lower courts 
without a clear framework to follow. Part IV proposes that the Court, 
instead of construing the doctrines to avoid a constitutional problem, 
must actually perform an analysis that will enable antitrust law to 
coexist with the First Amendment and federalism principles without 
sacrificing protections for the consumer. By engaging in this 
analysis, the Court can define the boundaries of the immunities and 
create clearer guidelines for the lower courts to follow. This Article 
proposes that the Court can scale back the immunities without 
infringing on First Amendment rights or encroaching on state 
sovereignty. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court created the Noerr-Pennington and state 
action doctrines in three landmark cases.
29
 Since the Court created 
the two doctrines, it has modified them by expanding and limiting 
their application over time.
30
 However, since the creation of the 
doctrines, these exceptions to antitrust law have proven to be not 
 
 29. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Noerr, 365 U.S. at 
127; Parker, 317 U.S. at 341. 
 30. See infra Part II.A–B. 
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only confusing but also harmful to the very goals antitrust law is 
supposed to promote.
31
 
A.  The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, efforts to lobby the 
government for legislation, executive action, or judicial decisions are 
immune from antitrust liability, even where the purpose of the action 
is to restrain trade or is otherwise anticompetitive.
32
 In order to 
qualify for immunity under this doctrine, the petition to the 
government must be a genuine attempt to obtain governmental 
action.
33
 A petition that is not actually intended to result in such 
action is considered a “sham” and is not entitled to Noerr 
immunity.
34
 A company, therefore, can lobby the state to enact laws 
that would adversely affect their market competitors without facing 
antitrust liability.
35
 This is the case even if the purpose of the 
campaign is to put competitors out of business, provided that the 
company is genuinely attempting to influence government action.
36
 
1.  Genesis of the Noerr Doctrine 
The Supreme Court created the Noerr doctrine in Eastern 
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.
37
 In 
Noerr, truckers alleged that a group of railroad companies violated 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a publicity 
campaign.
38
 The campaign sought to harm the competing trucking 
industry by creating dislike for truckers among the public and 
fostering support for measures, such as securing a veto of a law that 
would have allowed trucks to carry heavier loads.
39
 A unanimous 
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act does not prohibit attempts 
to influence the legislature to pass a particular law, even if the law 
 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Pennington, 381 
U.S. at 657; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 127. 
 33. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139–40. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
 38. Id. at 129–30. 
 39. Id. 
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would result in a monopoly.
40
 The Court rested its decision on a 
finding that the Sherman Act was not intended to regulate political 
activity, and therefore the railroads’ petitioning did not fall within 
the scope of the Act.
41
 Thus, the Court held that “the Sherman Act 
[did] not apply to the activities of the railroads at least insofar as 
those activities comprised mere solicitation of governmental action 
with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws.”
42
 
The Court also recognized that the case presented First 
Amendment questions.
43
 For example, it noted the significance of the 
right to petition and declined to “impute” to Congress an “intent to 
invade” the “freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights.”
44
 Moreover, 
the Court stated that a statute that created liability for efforts to 
petition the government “would raise important constitutional 
questions.”
45
 However, because it ultimately found that the Act was 
not meant to regulate in the political arena, the Court did not conduct 
any constitutional analysis.
46
 By failing to draw a line between the 
goals of antitrust law and the constitutionally protected right to 
petition, the Court failed to identify—let alone resolve—the conflict 
between the First Amendment and antitrust law. As a result, the 
Court created an excessively broad immunity that left lower courts 
without clear guidelines to apply in similar cases. 
2.  The Court Used the Canon of Constitutional 
Avoidance in Creating the Noerr Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has traditionally interpreted statutes so as to 
avoid a conflict with the Constitution.
47
 This canon of statutory 
 
 40. Id. at 136. 
 41. Id. at 137 (“To hold that the . . . people cannot freely inform the government of their 
wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not business activity, but political 
activity, a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of that Act.”). 
 42. Id. at 138. 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 137–38. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Adam Eckstein, The Petition Clause and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Constitutional 
and Consistency Arguments for Providing Noerr-Pennington Immunity to ADR, 75 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1683, 1689 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has interpreted statutes narrowly so as to avoid 
abridging the right of petition.”). 
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interpretation is known as constitutional avoidance.
48
 However, the 
Court has qualified this requirement by saying that courts are 
required to construe the statute in a way that avoids a conflict only if 
“an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible.”
49
 
Scholars and lower courts have considered Noerr to be an application 
of this canon
50
 because the Court avoided a conflict between the 
Sherman Act and the Constitution by saying that the Sherman Act 
was simply not meant to regulate petitions to the government.
51
 The 
Court called an agreement to jointly petition the government for 
legislation fundamentally dissimilar from the agreements that 
typically violate the Sherman Act.
52
 The Court could not “lightly 
impute to Congress an intent to invade [the] freedoms” protected by 
the First Amendment
53
 and said that such an interpretation would 
have no basis in the legislative history of the Sherman Act.
54
 
However, in doing so, the Court failed to articulate exactly what type 
of restrictions on anticompetitive behavior would invade those 
freedoms. 
3.  Limitations of Noerr Immunity: 
The Sham Exception 
Although the Court subsequently expanded Noerr immunity to 
apply in the context of petitions to the executive branch,
55
 the 
judicial branch, and administrative agencies,
56
 the Court has also 
 
 48. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 931 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he rule of statutory 
construction known as the canon of constitutional avoidance . . . requires a statute to be construed 
so as to avoid serious doubts as to the constitutionality of an alternate construction.”). 
 49. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (internal quotations and citation omitted); 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn 
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principal that 
this court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the 
question may be avoided.” (emphasis added)). 
 50. Sosa, 437 F.3d at 931 n.5 (“Noerr-Pennington is a specific application of . . . the canon 
of constitutional avoidance.”). 
 51. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 141 (“The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the 
business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena.”). 
 52. Id. at 136. 
 53. Id. at 138. 
 54. Id. at 137. 
 55. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670–71 (1965). 
 56. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972) (“[I]t 
would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that groups with common 
interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state 
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placed some important limitations on the doctrine.
57
 Perhaps the 
most notable limitation is the sham exception, which applies in 
situations where the petition is “a mere sham to cover what is 
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the 
business relationships of a competitor.”
58
 Where the petition is 
actually an attempt to interfere with a competitor’s business, liability 
under the Sherman Act is appropriate.
59
 The Court applied the sham 
exception for the first time in California Motor Transport.
60
 There, a 
group of highway carriers brought an action against another group of 
highway carriers, alleging that they violated the Sherman Act by 
initiating several judicial and administrative proceedings to eliminate 
the competition of other trucking groups.
61
 The plaintiffs alleged, 
and the Court agreed, that the purpose of the proceedings was to 
eliminate competition and put the other truckers out of business.
62
 
The Court held that one baseless claim would likely not fall under 
the sham exception, but a pattern of repetitive claims would be 
considered an abuse of the administrative and judicial processes and, 
as such, would fall squarely within the exception.
63
 Interestingly, the 
Court justified its decision to deny Noerr immunity by pointing to 
the fact that “First Amendment rights are not immunized from 
regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct which 
violates a valid statute.”
64
 Although the Court did not change the 
essential understanding of Noerr—that the Sherman Act simply is 
not meant to regulate in the political arena—the Court recognized 
that it was looking to First Amendment principles to guide how the 
doctrine, and specifically, the sham exception, should be applied. 
 
and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view respecting resolution 
of their business and economic interests vis-à-vis their competitors.”). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 511 (applying the sham exception for the first time); id. at 513 
(discussing a misrepresentation exception). 
 58. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 511. 
 61. Id. at 509. 
 62. See id. at 515. 
 63. Id. at 513. 
 64. Id. at 514. 
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4.  Limiting the Limitation: 
Narrowing the Sham Exception 
After California Motor Transport, there was much confusion 
about the scope of the sham exception, and lower courts generally 
applied it broadly.
65
 In 1988, in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. 
Indian Head, Inc. (“Allied Tube”),
66
 the Court sought to define the 
sham exception and limit its application.
67
 Although it declined to 
apply Noerr immunity, the Court held that a genuine effort to affect 
governmental action cannot constitute a sham, even if the methods 
used to effect the change are improper.
68
 The Court then narrowed 
the exception even further in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc. (“Omni”),
69
 where it held that the “‘sham’ 
exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use the 
governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—
as an anticompetitive weapon.”
70
 In Omni, the city council passed 
legislation sought by Columbia Outdoor Advertising, which required 
the council’s approval for all newly constructed billboards.
71
 
Because Columbia sought to disrupt its competitors’ business 
through the product of its lobbying efforts (the zoning ordinances) 
rather than through the lobbying itself, the sham exception did not 
apply, and Columbia was entitled immunity under Noerr.
72
 This 
holding effectively limited the sham exception to the point that it will 
almost never apply.
73
 In most situations, it is unlikely that the party 
lobbying for anticompetitive action will want to harm its competitor 
 
 65. See Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 
RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 978 (2003) (noting that after “the Noerr/Pennington/California Motor 
Transport trilogy . . . [m]any courts distorted ‘sham’ to make it apply to all forms of improper or 
unethical petitioning conduct deemed not worthy of antitrust immunity”). 
 66. 486 U.S. 492 (1988). 
 67. Lao, supra note 65, at 979–81. 
 68. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 507 n.10 (rejecting the dissent’s approach to the sham 
exception, which would exclude from Noerr immunity a defendant’s genuine attempts to affect 
the government if done through improper means); see also Lao, supra note 65, at 981 (“In 
emphasizing that genuine efforts to influence government do not constitute sham, no matter how 
improper the methods used, the Supreme Court radically changed the sham exception.” (emphasis 
and footnote omitted)). 
 69. 499 U.S. 365 (1991). 
 70. Id. at 380. 
 71. Id. at 367–69. 
 72. Id. at 381. 
 73. Id. 
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only through the process of lobbying and not through the legislation 
as well.
74
 
Two years after Omni, the Court narrowed the sham exception 
yet again in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”)
75
 by creating a two-part test that 
increases the plaintiff’s burden in proving that a petition is a sham 
and therefore not immunized by Noerr.
76
 To satisfy the first part of 
the test, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless.
77
 If it is objectively 
baseless, a court then looks at the litigant’s subjective motivation for 
bringing the lawsuit.
78
 This second prong is where the court 
considers whether the petitioner seeks to interfere with competition 
through the petitioning process, rather than through the outcome, as 
outlined in Omni.
79
 
5.  Other Limitations of Noerr: 
Exceptions for Fraud 
Another potential limitation on Noerr immunity is a fraud or 
misrepresentation exception.
80
 Although the Court in both California 
Motor Transport and Allied Tube indicated in dicta that “fraud and 
misrepresentations made in an adjudicatory context exceeded 
Noerr’s reach [but] were immune in a legislative setting,” the Court 
reopened the issue in PRE without giving an answer as to whether an 
exception exists.
81
 Additionally, although the Court substantially 
narrowed the sham exception in Allied Tube, it also limited the scope 
of the Noerr doctrine generally by declining to extend immunity to 
 
 74. Lao, supra note 65, at 983 (“In view of Omni Outdoor Advertising, sham would rarely, if 
ever, apply to any legislative lobbying because it is unlikely that one merely hopes to injure a 
competitor through the process of petitioning for favorable legislation rather than through the 
enactment itself.”). 
 75. 508 U.S. 49 (1993). 
 76. Id. at 60. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 60–61. 
 80. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1988); Cal. 
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512–13 (1972). 
 81. Lao, supra note 65, at 987–88; Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 61 n.6 (“We 
need not decide here whether, and if so, to what extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust 
liability for a litigant’s fraud or other misrepresentations.”); Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499–500; 
Cal. Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 512–13. 
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all genuine efforts to influence government action.
82
 The Court held 
that whether Noerr immunity applies in a particular case depends on 
the nature, context, and impact of the activity.
83
 
Although certain limitations on Noerr immunity exist, the Court 
has continued to broaden the reach of the doctrine, as seen with the 
narrowing of the sham exception.
84
 While it is unclear whether a 
fraud or misrepresentation exception exists, the Court has 
conclusively stated that there is no conspiracy exception to Noerr 
immunity.
85
 The Court has also held that the incidental effects of 
petitioning will be protected by Noerr immunity.
86
 Thus, in Allied 
Tube, although petitioning a private standard-setting organization 
was not itself covered by Noerr, the Court held that immunity might 
still apply if petitioning the organization was incidental to a valid 
effort to influence the government.
87
 
B.  The State Action Doctrine 
The state action doctrine mandates that federal antitrust laws do 
not apply to states acting in their sovereign capacity.
88
 
Anticompetitive action qualifies for immunity under this doctrine if 
it is authorized by a clearly articulated state regulatory policy and 
subjected to active state supervision when the actor is a private 
party
89
 For example, a state legislature can implement a regulatory 
 
 82. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 503. 
 83. Id. at 504. 
 84. See supra Part II.A.3; see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 
365, 380 (1991) (rejecting a conspiracy exception to Noerr); Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502 
(expanding Noerr protection to the incidental effects of petitioning as well as the petitioning 
itself). 
 85. Omni, 499 U.S. at 383 (“[A] ‘conspiracy’ exception to Noerr must be rejected.”). 
 86. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 502–03. 
 87. Id. The Court in Allied Tube declined to apply Noerr immunity because the injury 
alleged in the case, a “restraint . . . imposed by persons unaccountable to the public and without 
official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restraining competition,” 
had resulted from private, rather than government action. Id. at 502. However, after declining to 
extend Noerr immunity, the Court then went on to discuss the Noerr doctrine, deciding whether 
Noerr might still apply because the petitioning of the association, whose actions the Court said 
were not quasi-legislative, might have been incidental to a valid petitioning of the government. 
Id. 
 88. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351–52 (1943). While Parker is generally recognized as 
the case that created the State Action doctrine in its current form, there are some scholars that 
trace the doctrine to decisions prior to Parker. See supra note 24. 
 89. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
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policy that allows cities to choose which utility company to use. The 
city may then grant a monopoly to a certain utility company pursuant 
to that regulatory policy, even if the city’s purpose is anticompetitive 
and otherwise violates antitrust laws.
90
 
1.  Evolution of the State Action Doctrine 
The Court created the state action doctrine in Parker v. Brown.
91
 
That case involved a California regulatory program that dictated how 
raisin growers could market their crops.
92
 The purpose of the 
program was to restrict competition among raisin growers and to 
control the price of the raisins distributed to packers.
93
 A producer 
and packer of raisins brought suit, claiming that the legislation was 
anticompetitive and therefore violated the Sherman Act.
94
 A 
unanimous Court held that states acting in their sovereign capacity 
are not subject to antitrust liability, even if the state action was 
anticompetitive.
95
 In so holding, the Court emphasized that there was 
nothing in either the language or history of the Act that would 
suggest that this was the intent of the statute.
96
 The Court highlighted 
the fact that the immunity is rooted in the principles of federalism, 
saying that “[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the 
Constitution, the states are sovereign . . . an unexpressed purpose to 
nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be 
attributed to Congress.”
97
 However, just as the Court in Noerr skirted 
the conflict between antitrust law and the First Amendment’s right to 
petition by holding that the Sherman Act simply did not apply to 
petitioning activity, the Court in Parker construed the Sherman Act 
in a way that avoided any conflict with the principles of federalism. 
The Court said that Congress did not intend to bring state action 
within the realm of antitrust liability
98
 and found “nothing in the 
 
 90. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 352. 
 91. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 92. Id. at 344–47. 
 93. Id. at 346. 
 94. Id. at 344. 
 95. Id. at 351–52. 
 96. Id. at 350–51. 
 97. Id. at 351. 
 98. Id. at 350–51. 
  
Summer 2012] DEFERENCE OR DESTRUCTION? 1311 
 
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggest[ed] that 
its purpose was to restrain a state.”
99
 
However, the underlying problem that the Court sought to 
resolve in creating the state action doctrine was a preemption 
problem raised by the federalist system of government.
100
 The 
Supremacy Clause
101
 allows a court to invalidate a state law when 
Congress expressly preempts state law, when there is a direct conflict 
between state and federal law, or when Congress has left no room in 
its regulatory scheme for states to regulate.
102
 Thus, it seems that 
federal antitrust laws should preempt any state regulation in the 
area.
103
 The Court did point to a federalism problem, stating that 
“[i]n a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, 
the states are sovereign . . . an unexpressed purpose to nullify a 
state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly to be 
attributed to Congress.”
104
 However, rather than engaging in a 
discussion of when there would be a conflict between a state’s 
sovereignty and the federal antitrust laws, the Court simply reiterated 
that the legislative history of the Sherman Act showed that the Act 
was not meant to regulate in this area at all.
105
 
Since Parker, the Court has refined the state action doctrine.
106
 
In California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum 
(“Midcal”),
107
 the Court created a two-part test for state action 
 
 99. Id. at 350. 
 100. James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International 
Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 
1568 (2010). 
 101. The Supremacy Clause states as follows: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 102. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1568. 
 103. Id. at 1569–70 (“[T]he antitrust laws express a national policy in favor of competition 
and . . . Congress acted to the fullest extent of its commerce powers when enacting the antitrust 
laws.”) (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) and United States v. 
Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945)). 
 104. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 106 (1980). 
 107. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). 
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immunity.
108
 First, the challenged action must be taken pursuant to a 
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.
109
 
Second, the state must actively supervise this conduct.
110
 However, 
the Court has not clearly defined how this test should be applied. 
Lower courts are split as to what level of supervision is sufficient to 
satisfy Midcal’s requirement.
111
  
The Supreme Court narrowed the active supervision requirement 
in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co.
112
 There, rating bureaus 
organized by the defendant insurance companies were authorized by 
four states to set joint rates for title searches.
113
 Once the bureau set 
the rates, the rates became effective unless the state rejected them 
within a certain period.
114
 The Court held that such a system of 
review was not sufficient to satisfy the active supervision 
requirement.
115
 The Court required more than “[s]ome basic level of 
activity directed towards seeing that the private actors carry out the 
state’s policy and not simply their own.”
116
 It required a showing that 
“the State has played a substantial role in determining the specifics 
of the economic policy.”
117
 Under the facts of this particular case, it 
required that the state had determined the specifics of the rate-setting 
scheme.
118
 However, apart from this fact-specific determination, 
nowhere in the opinion did the Court provide guidance about how 
much supervision would be sufficient to meet its requirement that the 
state play a substantial role.
119
 
Additionally, the Court has not clarified what constitutes a 
“clearly articulated” state policy under the first prong of the test.
120
 
 
 108. Id. at 105. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work, 5 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 130–33 (2006). 
 112. 504 U.S. 621 (1992). 
 113. Id. at 629. 
 114. Id. (calling this approval system a “negative option” system). 
 115. Id. at 637. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 635. 
 118. Id. at 638. 
 119. Justice O’Connor recognized the majority decision’s flaw in her dissent. Id. at 647 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). Although arguing for a more flexible requirement, she noted that “the 
majority does not offer any guidance as to what level of supervision will suffice.” Id. 
 120. The Court has applied several different standards, including that the authorization be 
“affirmatively expressed,” Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 
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The language used by the Court in Midcal seemed to reflect the 
Court’s desire to give deference to states in implementing their own 
regulations.
121
 However, the Court stepped back from this 
requirement in both Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire 
(“Hallie”)
122
 and Southern Motor Carriers when it held that 
anticompetitive conduct need only be “foreseeable” from a state’s 
grant of power in order for it to be considered authorized under a 
clearly articulated policy.
123
 Lower courts have been unsure whether 
foreseeability is enough.
124
 The Tenth Circuit recently noted this 
confusion, pointing to some Supreme Court cases that required an 
affirmatively expressed grant of authority to suppress competition 
and others that required “something less of cities seeking to invoke 
Parker’s protections”—namely, those that suggest that foreseeability 
is sufficient.
125
 The court then concluded that, “though it’s hard to 
see a way to reconcile all of the Court’s competing statements in this 
area, we can say with certainty this much—a municipality surely 
lacks antitrust ‘immunity’ unless it can bear the burden of showing 
that its challenged conduct was at least a foreseeable (if not explicit) 
result of state legislation.”
126
 
Because of this ill-defined standard, the lower courts have 
different ways of determining whether there is a clearly articulated 
state policy, which has resulted in both broad and narrow 
applications of the foreseeability standard.
127
 For example, the 
Seventh Circuit recently applied this standard very broadly, holding 
that “it is generally understood that the authority to contract 
 
105 (1980), that anticompetitive conduct “logically would result,” from the state’s authorization, 
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985), and that anticompetitive conduct is 
a foreseeable result of the state’s policy. Id. 
 121. Hettich, supra note 111, at 111 (explaining that Midcal immunized actions “emanating 
from a sovereign state, i.e. actions, which can be attributed directly to the state” and thereby 
granted “immunity [to] private actors . . . when obeying anticompetitive regulation enacted by a 
sovereign entity”). 
 122. 471 U.S. 34 (1985). 
 123. Id. at 42; S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 65 
(1982). 
 124. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, Okla., 647 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1043. 
 127. Compare Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying 
the test broadly), with Shames v. Cal. Travel & Tourism Comm’n, 626 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(applying the test narrowly); see also Hettich, supra note 111, at 122–26 (discussing several cases 
where the foreseeability standard was applied both narrowly and broadly). 
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contemplates the power to create exclusive contracts.”
128
 Thus, a 
monopoly and other anticompetitive conduct was the foreseeable 
result of a statute that allowed a city to enter into contracts for waste 
disposal.
129
 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that “a 
foreseeable result cannot create state authorization itself. . . . Rather, 
‘foreseeability’ is to be used in deciding the reach of antitrust 
immunity that stems from an already authorized [anticompetitive 
conduct]”.
130
 Recently, in an attempt to make sense of these 
conflicting views, the Tenth Circuit identified “at least a few bright 
lines . . . in this muddled arena.”
131
 First, there must be more than the 
traditional grant of authority in a municipal charter.
132
 Second, that a 
state authorized some anticompetitive conduct does not mean all 
other anticompetitive conduct is foreseeable.
133
 Third, to determine 
whether a state authorized anticompetitive conduct, the court must 
look at “the most specific direction issued by the state legislature on 
the subject.”
134
 However, even applying the Tenth Circuit’s bright-
line rules, it is far from clear what makes anticompetitive conduct 
foreseeable.
135
 
The Court has also held that while a municipality is not itself 
sovereign and therefore not per se exempted from antitrust law, the 
state can use a city to implement its own clearly articulated 
 
 128. Active Disposal, Inc., 635 F.3d at 889. 
 129. Id.; see also Massengale v. City of Jefferson, Mo., No. 10-CV-4232-NKL, 2011 WL 
3320508 slip op. at *8 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2011) (holding that although the state did not 
“expressly grant municipalities the power to grant exclusive solid waste disposal contracts,” the 
clearly articulated policy requirement was met because displacing competition was “a necessary 
and reasonable consequence of engaging in the authorized activity,” regulating solid waste 
disposal); Metro W. Ambulance v. Clark Cnty., Wash., No. C10-5809RJB, 2011 WL 7153926, at 
*13 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 22, 2011) (granting state action immunity to a county where the county 
granted an exclusive contract to an ambulance service, because this contract was the foreseeable 
result of a state law that authorized any county to establish a system of ambulance service and 
award contracts for ambulance service). 
 130. Shames, 626 F.3d at 1084. 
 131. Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, Okla., 647 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1043–44. 
 134. Id. at 1044. 
 135. Id. at 1043 (“[W]hat does and doesn’t qualify as foreseeable is hardly ‘self-evident’ or 
self-defining, itself perhaps another reason to eschew the [foreseeability] test.”). The Court then 
found that it was “clear” that the defendant in the case did not enjoy immunity because the state 
had not authorized the anticompetitive behavior. Id. at 1044. It is interesting that the court would 
use this language after discussing the confusion that exists within the test and then reverse the 
district court’s dismissal of the case in favor of the defendant. 
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policies.
136
 Similarly, regulatory agencies are not per se immune 
from antitrust laws, but a state can also use a regulatory agency to 
implement its own policy.
137
 However, it is unclear whether these 
regulatory agencies should be treated more like private actors or 
municipalities.
138
 In Hallie, after holding that active supervision is 
not required for municipalities, the Court said in a footnote, “In cases 
in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active supervision 
would also not be required, although we do not here decide that 
issue.”
139
 Thus, lower courts have been left without any guidance on 
whether they should require active supervision for state regulatory 
boards and other similar state entities. In North Carolina State Board 
of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission,
140
 the North 
Carolina Board of Dental Examiners (“the Board”) brought an action 
against the FTC, seeking a declaration that active supervision is not 
required for immunity to apply to regulatory agencies under the state 
action doctrine.
141
 In the underlying proceeding, the Board claimed 
that it was immune from antitrust liability under the state action 
doctrine, but the FTC denied the Board’s motion, saying that the 
Board did not qualify for exemption because its conduct was not 
actively supervised by the state.
142
 The court noted that “the law is 
unsettled as to whether or not [the Board] is subject to the antitrust 
laws under the Parker state action doctrine,” citing both Hallie and 
F.T.C. v. Monahan,
143
 a 1987 First Circuit decision that held that 
active supervision may be required for state regulatory boards.
144
 
Thus, while the parameters of the doctrine have been defined, how 
and when the doctrine applies is not entirely clear. 
 
 136. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978). 
 137. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 68 (1982). 
 138. Hettich, supra note 111, at 117–18. 
 139. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46–47 & n.10 (1985). 
 140. 768 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D.N.C. 2011). 
 141. Id. at 822. 
 142. Id. at 820–21. 
 143. 832 F.2d 688 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 144. F.T.C., 768 F. Supp. 2d at 824. 
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2.  Expansions of State Action Immunity 
As with Noerr, the Court has both expanded and limited state 
action immunity.
145
 Generally, the Court has limited the doctrine by 
requiring that state action is authorized and actively supervised by 
the state.
146
 Additionally, the Court has held that a home-rule 
provision, by which a state gives a city blanket authority to create its 
own regulations and policies, is not sufficient for antitrust immunity 
because it does not satisfy the “clearly articulated . . . policy” prong 
of the Midcal test.
147
 
However, there have been several significant expansions of the 
doctrine. As with Noerr, the Court has refused to recognize a 
conspiracy exception to state action immunity.
148
 Before Omni, 
several courts had refused to grant state action immunity where local 
government officials had conspired with private parties to act 
anticompetitively.
149
 Those courts relied on the language of Parker, 
which suggested that the Court would not have granted immunity if a 
state or municipality had combined with others to restrain trade.
150
 
However, the Omni Court rejected this interpretation of Parker, 
holding that Parker “simply clar[ified] that [state action] immunity 
does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory 
capacity but as a commercial participant in a given market.”
151
 Thus, 
in Omni, the fact that the city council had not only agreed with but 
had also been paid by its local constituents to enact a regulation in 
their favor did not preclude state action immunity.
152
 The Court 
refused to create such an exception on the assumption that it is 
 
 145. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991); 
Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982) (holding that a home rule 
provision is not sufficient for immunity). 
 146. Only state action that meets these standards will be immunized under Parker. Cal. Retail 
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
 147. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 54–55. 
 148. Omni, 499 U.S. at 374. 
 149. See, e.g., Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975), abrogated by 499 U.S. 
365; Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641, 646 (D.S.C. 1975); see also E. Thomas 
Sullivan, Antitrust Regulation of Land Use: Federalism’s Triumph over Competition, the Last 
Fifty Years, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 473, 480–81 (2000) (discussing the former conspiracy 
exception and citing to Westborough Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 
1982) and Witworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated 435 U.S. 992 (1978)). 
 150. Sullivan, supra note 149, at 481. 
 151. Omni, 499 U.S. at 374–75. 
 152. Id. at 378. 
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“desirable for legislators and their constituents to agree to pursue a 
[certain] policy.”
153
 Creating an exception to state action immunity 
would subject legislators to antitrust liability in such a situation, 
which was a consequence the Court wished to avoid.
154
 
Many other expansions of the doctrine apply to immunize the 
actions taken by municipalities. In Hallie, the Court held that active 
supervision is not required for municipalities.
155
 The Court reasoned 
that municipalities are unlikely to act in the interest of private parties, 
and that the requirement of a clearly articulated state policy alleviates 
any danger that they will act for “purely parochial public interests at 
the expense of more overriding state goals.”
156
 The Court also held 
that the state need not compel the municipality to enact the policy in 
order for the immunity to apply.
157
 Rather, it is sufficient that the 
state authorize the municipality to engage in anticompetitive 
behavior.
158
 Further, the Hallie Court introduced a foreseeability 
standard, immunizing the municipality’s activity so long as 
anticompetitive conduct could logically result from the authority 
granted to the municipality by the state.
159
 In Southern Motor 
Carriers, the Court expanded its holding in Hallie and held that 
compulsion is not required for private actors either.
160
 The Court 
stayed consistent with the foreseeability standard it established in 
Hallie, saying that there need not be detailed, specific authorization 
for private anticompetitive action as long as it is clear that the state 
intends to displace competition in a specific area.
161
 
 
 153. Id. at 375 (“[I]t is both inevitable and desirable that public officials often agree to do 
what one or another group of private citizens urges upon them.”); McGowan & Lemley, supra 
note 27, at 350. 
 154. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 350; see also Duke & Co., 521 F.2d at 1282 
(holding a claim could be stated against antitrust defendants, despite their governmental status 
because “it is clear that when there is an allegation of governmental participation in [a 
combination of public and private entities] to the benefit or detriment of private parties . . . a 
claim has been stated under the antitrust laws”). 
 155. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46–47 (1985). 
 156. Id. at 47. 
 157. Id. at 45–46. 
 158. Id. at 45. 
 159. Id. at 42. 
 160. S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 60 (1985). 
 161. Id. at 65–66. 
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III.  CRITIQUE 
Because the Court has failed to recognize a conflict between the 
goals of the antitrust laws on the one hand and the First Amendment 
and federalism on the other, the Court has not used a principled 
method of creating the boundaries of the Noerr or state action 
immunities. The sham exception to the Noerr doctrine is far too 
narrow and is ineffective as a limit. The lack of a misrepresentation 
exception creates additional problems within the doctrine because it 
undermines the democratic process. Additionally, the foreseeability 
standard within the state action doctrine requires almost nothing in 
terms of a clear state policy before it immunizes the anticompetitive 
conduct of a municipality or a private actor. Municipalities are left to 
act in their own best interests since they are exempted from the 
active supervision requirement. As a result, both the Noerr and state 
action doctrines are far too broad, and consequently, consumers are 
harmed because they do not receive the protection of antitrust laws. 
A.  The Court Misinterpreted 
the Sherman Act by Using the 
Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
The Noerr Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act, by which 
the conflict between the First Amendment and antitrust laws was 
avoided, is inaccurate in light of the Act’s legislative history. The 
Court held that there was no basis in the legislative history of the 
Sherman Act to regulate political activity rather than business 
activity.
162
 However, “part of the ‘public outcry’ generally seen as 
leading to the passage of the Sherman Act involved the widely held 
view that the nineteenth-century economic giants . . . secured and 
maintained their monopolies through unethical economic and 
political practices.”
163
 In one of the speeches Senator Sherman made 
in defense of his bill, he included the political influence of the trusts 
as a reason to take legislative action.
164
 Further, the common law, 
which was expressly incorporated into the Sherman Act, condemned 
monopolies obtained by deceptive or coercive petitioning of the 
 
 162. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961). 
 163. Faulkner, supra note 1, at 696 (emphasis added) (emphasis omitted). 
 164. Id. at 697. 
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legislature.
165
 Thus, it seems clear that the Sherman Act’s drafters 
did intend the Act to apply in the political arena.
166
 Further, 
protection of free speech and the development of First Amendment 
jurisprudence did not gather momentum until the 1930s.
167
 At the 
time Congress enacted the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court had not 
even applied the First Amendment right to petition.
168
 However, by 
the time Noerr was decided in 1961, First Amendment jurisprudence 
had been developed and strengthened, so it was recognized that the 
government was prohibited from interfering with the political 
activities of its citizens.
169
 Thus, at that time, “[t]he political process, 
by which information is conveyed and desires expressed, [was] 
considered too important to be restricted by concerns for . . . 
economic liberty.”
170
 Therefore, while the Noerr Court held that 
there was no basis in the history of the Sherman Act for applying 
antitrust laws to political activity, it seems more likely that the Court 
was simply reacting to the prevailing norms of its time. The Court’s 
intention likely was to give utmost deference to citizens in 
petitioning and speech activity. However, instead of creating an 
exception to the Sherman Act out of deference to the First 
Amendment, the Court incorrectly stated that the Sherman Act was 
not meant to regulate this area. 
B.  The Noerr Court’s Failure to Recognize a Conflict 
Between Antitrust Law and the First Amendment in 
Has Resulted in an Excessively Broad Immunity 
Although it was a simple solution for the Court to construe the 
Sherman Act to avoid any conflict with the First Amendment, the 
goals of antitrust law and the goals of the First Amendment do 
 
 165. Id. at 702. 
 166. Id. at 697–99 (discussing a speech by Senator Sherman, 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890), in 
support of Sherman’s bill, and arguing that he would exempt a farmers’ lobby not because “his 
bill only applied to ‘economic’ or ‘trade’ activity or that all attempts to ‘affect public opinion’ 
[were] excluded from the bill’s broad language,” but because Sherman viewed the lobby as 
having a beneficial purpose). 
 167. See id. at 707. 
 168. Id. at 704. 
 169. See id. at 708. 
 170. Id. 
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frequently conflict.
171
 The First Amendment protects the citizens’ 
request for governmental action,
172
 but when those requests or the 
result of the requests create anticompetitive effects, they naturally 
conflict with antitrust laws.
173
 Although, under the Supremacy 
Clause, the Constitution must prevail when a conflict arises, the 
Supreme Court made Noerr immunity unnecessarily complicated by 
not recognizing that a conflict exists when it created the doctrine.
174
 
Instead of creating an exception to antitrust law, where immunity is 
carved out in deference to the First Amendment, the Court said that 
antitrust law did not apply at all.
175
 Although it seems that the result 
would be the same, by taking the First Amendment issue out of the 
equation altogether, the Court failed to create any boundaries to the 
doctrine.
176
 If there is no conflict and the Sherman Act simply does 
not apply, it is much harder for the courts to know when to apply 
Noerr than it would be if they could use the First Amendment as a 
guideline. The Supreme Court’s failure has resulted in the 
development of an unclear doctrine, which is too broad and which 
the lower courts are still applying inconsistently fifty years after it 
was created.
177
 
 
 171. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 297 (“[A] statutory preference for competition 
may conflict with a constitutional mandate for self-government and freedom of speech.”). 
 172. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the 
people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 173. Lao, supra note 65, at 966 (“[W]hen efforts to persuade the government produce 
anticompetitive effects, they necessarily also impinge upon antitrust law, creating tension 
between that law and the First Amendment and related values.”); McGowan & Lemley, supra 
note 27, at 296 (“[P]etitioning, in and of itself, can have dramatically anticompetitive effects, 
even if the petitioning is unsuccessful.”). 
 174. The Supremacy Clause provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, any conflict between constitutional law and antitrust law must be 
decided in favor of the Constitution. However, as the doctrine currently exists, the Court is not 
just giving deference to the Constitution since the Court said that antitrust law was not meant to 
regulate in this area. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 
138 (1961). If the Court explicitly recognizes the conflict between the First Amendment and 
antitrust law, even though the First Amendment must prevail, the Court can still narrow Noerr 
while respecting the tension between and the hierarchy of these principles. 
 175. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 300 (“The Court is clear that it does not want 
to encroach on the First Amendment rights identified in Noerr. . . . But the Court has not used 
First Amendment principles in defining the scope of the doctrine.”). 
 176. Id. (The “doctrine [has] developed solely by the desire to avoid a problem—trampling 
upon First Amendment rights—without reference to a theory that tells us when that problem 
arises or why.”). 
 177. See id. at 300–01, 363. 
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1.  Is the Sham Exception Itself a Sham? 
The Court could have used the sham exception as a tool to 
narrow the reach of Noerr immunity.
178
 However, the exception has 
grown increasingly confusing and has been narrowed to the point 
where it is almost impossible to claim that something is a sham.
179
 
As such, it is ineffective as a limit to Noerr.
180
 The result of such a 
narrow exception is the immunization of too many petitions that, 
whether or not successful, give petitioners room to overcharge 
consumers and eliminate competitors.
181
 Petitioners are able to use 
the petitioning process to raise costs for their competitors or to delay 
the entry of competitors into the market. Even if the petition is 
eventually unsuccessful, the effect of the petition itself may eliminate 
competition and allow the petitioner to raise prices without 
competing products or services to bring those prices down.
182
 
a.  The PRE test raises the bar too high 
and fails to protect the consumer 
While the language of the PRE test may seem straightforward,
183
 
it is unclear how the test should be applied in practice. Much of this 
confusion was caused by the language Justice Thomas used in 
PRE.
184
 He did not clearly explain what “objectively baseless” 
meant, but instead defined an objectively baseless lawsuit as one in 
which “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on 
the merits”; one that lacked probable cause, as in the tort of 
 
 178. See Lao, supra note 65, at 980–81 (arguing that the Allied Tube Court drastically 
narrowed the sham exception where, given the breadth of the exception at the time, it could have 
held that the conduct in PRE was a sham and therefore not immune from antitrust liability). 
 179. See id. at 981 & n.116. 
 180. See Stacey B. Lee, Is a Cure on the Way? The Bad Medicine of Generics, Citizen 
Petitions, and Noerr-Pennington Immunity, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 98, 119–20 (2010) 
(describing how sham is ineffective in keeping out sham petitions in the brand drug industry). 
 181. Id. at 124. 
 182. Id. 
 183. In order for a petition to be considered a sham, the two-part PRE test requires first that 
the petition be objectively baseless so that “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect 
success on the merits[,]” and second, that the petitioners’ subjective motivation for the petition 
was an attempt to directly disrupt the business of a competitor. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. 
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 (1993); see also supra Part II.A.4 
(discussing the PRE test). 
 184. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60, 62–63, 65; see also Lao, supra note 65, at 
985–86 (describing the various ways Justice Thomas defined “objectively baseless). 
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malicious prosecution; and one that was not warranted by existing 
law or based on a good faith argument for the modification of the 
law, as in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”).
185
 Justice 
Thomas borrowed the language of Rule 11 and the requirements for 
malicious prosecution to define objectively baseless, but, as Justice 
Souter pointed out in his concurrence, the Rule 11 test and the 
requirements for malicious prosecution are not the same.
186
 Thus, 
what it means for a petition to be objectively baseless is unclear at 
best. As one commentator pointed out, “Many cases may be 
sufficiently weak that a reasonable litigant could not realistically 
expect success and yet not be so devoid of merit as to lack probable 
cause.”
187
 Moreover, while most people read PRE as a narrowing of 
the Court’s earlier application of the sham exception, the Ninth 
Circuit views the PRE and California Motor Transport tests as 
inconsistent and attempts to “reconcile these cases by reading them 
as applying to different situations.”
188
 The Ninth Circuit applies the 
two-part PRE analysis to cases in which a single action may be sham 
petitioning but applies California Motor Transport to cases where a 
whole series of legal proceedings may constitute sham petitioning.
189
 
In the latter situation, the court does not look at whether any of the 
proceedings had merit but instead looks at whether collectively they 
are brought for the purpose of harming or harassing a market rival.
190
 
The lack of clarity surrounding the PRE test makes it much more 
difficult for those harmed by petitions to claim an antitrust violation 
since it is unclear what will be enough to prove a sham. 
Additionally, the test that Justice Thomas articulated, which 
equates objectively baseless petitions with a lack of probable cause, 
is far too broad.
191
 The PRE Court said that a winning lawsuit 
 
 185. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60, 62–63, 65; see also Lao, supra note 65, at 
985–86 (describing the various ways Justice Thomas defined “objectively baseless”). 
 186. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 66–67 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 187. Lao, supra note 65, at 986. 
 188. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1046 (2009) 
(quoting USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800, 
810 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Lee, supra note 180, at 120 (“[T]he sham exception is unnecessarily restricted when the 
majority equates objectively baseless with a lack of probable cause.”). 
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precludes a finding that the suit is objectively baseless.
192
 Further, 
the court must not assume that a losing lawsuit was unreasonable or 
without foundation.
193
 Thus, from the outset, it will be difficult to 
find that a petition is objectively baseless.
194
 The current test “allows 
[an antitrust defendant] to present a sufficiently weak citizen petition 
with no reasonable expectation of success” and protects that petition 
because it is “not so devoid of merit as to lack probable cause.”
195
 
This sets the bar too high for proving a sham petition and often 
results in increased cost to the consumer, who without the sham 
exception has no tools to prove an antitrust violation.
196
 For example, 
in Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis,
197
 the court held 
that a petition to the FDA was not a sham, even though the defendant 
petitioner may have had no reasonable belief that the petition was 
viable.
198
 Instead, the court believed that the petitioner’s arguments 
were “arguably warranted by existing law or at the very least [ ]based 
on an objectively good faith argument for the extension, modification 
or reversal of existing law.”
199
 Using this language to determine 
whether the petition was objectively baseless allowed the court to 
conclude that the petition was not a sham, regardless of the fact that 
 
 192. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5 
(1993). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Lee, supra note 180, at 120; see also Lao, supra note 65, at 1025 (discussing the 
requirements and effect of the objectively baseless requirement). 
 195. Lee, supra note 180, at 120. 
 196. If the petition is not considered a sham, unless the petition involves fraudulent or false 
information and the jurisdiction recognizes a misrepresentation exception that applies to that case, 
the petition will be immunized by Noerr and those harmed by the anticompetitive effects of the 
petition have no recourse through antitrust law to protect themselves. 
 197. No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2008 WL 169362 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2008). 
 198. Id. at *5 [hereinafter LWD Ruling on Motion to Dismiss]. 
 199. La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ. 7343(HB), 2009 WL 2708110, 
at *4, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2009) [hereinafter LWD] (internal quotation marks omitted). In this 
case, Aventis, a drug manufacturer, filed a citizen petition with the FDA requesting that the FDA 
deny approval of any generic version of its drug, Arava. Id. at *1. The FDA denied the citizen 
petition, noting that Aventis' petition appeared to be based on a false premise. Id. at *2 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original). LWD, a wholesale drug company, then filed an 
antitrust action against Aventis claiming that Aventis’s petition was a sham designed to delay the 
entry of the generic drug into the market. Id. at *1. At trial, LWD introduced evidence that 
Aventis’s request for relief in the petition was contrary to FDA regulations and practices, and that 
the petition lacked scientific basis. Id. at *2. On Aventis’s motion to dismiss, the court had even 
pointed out that it was plausible that Aventis could have had no reasonable belief that its petition 
was viable. LWD Ruling on Motion to Dismiss at *5. Aventis was familiar with the FDA 
regulations and practices and had been subjected to the same regulations it now contested. Id. 
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the petition seemed to have little merit and was clearly harmful to the 
plaintiff and other consumers.
200
 The PRE test’s high bar allowed the 
defendant to submit its petition without antitrust liability and 
protected the petitioner’s activity at the expense of the consumer.
201
 
b.  The subjective intent requirement 
swallows the sham exception 
If the plaintiff is able to overcome the objectively baseless 
hurdle, the court then asks whether the petitioner’s subjective intent 
was to disrupt a competitor’s business rather than to obtain action 
from the government.
202
 This extra requirement makes the sham 
exception essentially ineffective.
203
 First, even if the petition is 
objectively baseless, there will almost never be a situation where the 
petitioner does not wish for success on the merits.
204
 Even if he does 
not expect to win, winning would ultimately help him, and thus, it is 
very difficult to prove that a petitioner’s sole intent was to interfere 
with the business of his competitor.
205
 
Second, by focusing on whether a petitioner’s intent was to 
achieve anticompetitive action through the results of a successful 
petition, the Court fails to look at how these results were obtained.
206
 
Even if a defendant uses the petition itself to harm the competitor, as 
long as the defendant actually wanted the results of a successful 
petition, the defendant’s conduct will be immunized. This allows the 
 
 200. The court considered Aventis’s arguments enough to give Aventis probable cause to file 
the petition, which precluded the petition from being objectively baseless. LWD at *7. Thus, the 
court protected the petition, which the FDA and even the court believed to have little to no merit, 
even though the petition allowed Aventis to maintain a monopoly over the drug for five months. 
Complaint at 2, La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Sanofi-Aventis, No. 07 Civ 7343, 2007 WL 3320445 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter LWD Complaint]. 
 201. LWD alleged that the monopoly created by the petition allowed Aventis to overcharge 
direct purchasers of the drug “by millions of dollars by depriving them of the results of 
competition from cheaper generic versions of Arava.” LWD Complaint at 9. Additionally, within 
three months of the generic drug being approved and starting to sell on the market, Aventis lost 
almost 80 percent of its $235 million in annual sales of the drug. Id. at 8. 
 202. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60–61 
(1993). 
 203. Lee, supra note 180, at 120; see also Lao, supra note 65, at 986 (arguging that the 
subjective prong may eviscerate the sham exception). 
 204. See Lao, supra note 65, at 986–87. 
 205. Id. at 983 (“[P]etitioners usually have mixed motives: they wish to secure the sought-
after government action, and they also wish to harm competitors through the process.”). 
 206. See id. 
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defendant to abuse the system at the expense of the consumer.
207
 For 
example, in Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, Inc.,
208
 the Ninth Circuit held that the filing of 
seventeen lawsuits did not constitute sham petitioning because the 
petitioner, Abbott, sought success on the merits.
209
 However, the 
court, in applying the subjective prong, failed to consider the fact 
that whether or not Abbott desired the intended result of the lawsuits, 
it was nevertheless able to delay the introduction of the generic drug, 
a drug that would cost significantly less for the consumer.
210
 Abbott 
was protected from antitrust liability because the current test only 
looks at whether it was possible to win the lawsuits and whether 
there was a chance that the petitioner really wanted to win the 
lawsuits. 
c.  Sham immunizes antitrust defendants 
that can afford to pay for protection 
The test for sham petitioning also provides protection for 
antitrust defendants that have the money to achieve the results they 
desire at the cost of the consumer.
211
 For example, in Omni, the 
 
 207. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 
2009); Armstrong Surgical Ctr., Inc. v. Armstrong Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 185 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 
1999). In Armstrong, the court held that a hospital’s petition was not a sham, regardless of its 
merit, because the hospital genuinely sought the results of its petition. Armstrong, 185 F.3d at 158 
n.2. There, a local hospital presented false information to the Department of Health, which was at 
the time considering whether to approve a competing surgical facility. Id. at 155–56. The court 
refused to consider whether the hospital’s opposition was a sham because even if the petition was 
objectively baseless, the hospital’s purpose was to obtain denial of the application. Id. at 158 n.2. 
 208. 552 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2009) 
 209. Id. at 1047. Abbott, a prescription drug manufacturer, filed seventeen lawsuits against 
other drug manufacturers that sought approval by the FDA to introduce a generic version of 
Abbott’s drug. Id. at 1046. By filing the lawsuits, Abbott received an automatic thirty-month stay 
on FDA approval of the generic drugs. Id. at 1039. The court concluded that these seventeen suits 
did not constitute a sham, even though Abbott lost ten of them, because Abbott brought them in 
order to protect its patents. Id. at 1047. 
 210. Id. at 1041. The plaintiff, a healthcare provider that purchased large quantities of 
prescription drugs, had paid 67–70 cents per tablet. Id. After the generic brand was available, it 
paid only 10 cents per tablet. Id. The drug at issue in the case generated $540 million in sales in 
1998 alone. Id. at 1038. Thus, the automatic thirty-month stay on all applications to produce the 
generic drug that resulted from the filing of patent infringement suits, whether or not Abbott 
actually expected or wanted to win those suits, could have resulted in over a billion dollars in 
revenue for the company. 
 211. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 368–69 (1991). 
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Court considered that Columbia
212
 sought anticompetitive results 
through the product of its lobbying efforts rather than through the 
lobbying itself. The Court held that Columbia’s petition was not a 
sham and thus was protected from antitrust liability.
213
 Under the 
Court’s current test, the petition in question clearly was not a sham. 
However, the Court was so focused on the fact that Columbia 
actually wanted to see the legislation passed that it held that “any 
denial to Omni of ‘meaningful access to the appropriate city 
administrative and legislative fora’ was achieved by [Columbia] in 
the course of an attempt to influence governmental action that, far 
from being a ‘sham,’ was if anything more in earnest than it should 
have been.”
214
 Because Columbia’s goal of getting the legislation 
passed was the only thing that mattered in determining whether the 
petition was a sham, the Court actually sanctioned the fact that 
Columbia’s competitors were denied access to the city council 
because Columbia had essentially bribed its members.
215
 As a result, 
Columbia, which essentially bought legislation from its city council 
that prevented other companies from effectively competing with it, 
was immunized from liability.
216
 This problem is compounded by the 
lack of conspiracy exceptions in both the Noerr and state action 
doctrines.
217
 
 
 212. Columbia was a billboard company that controlled 95 percent of the billboard market. Id. 
at 367. Columbia sought to interfere with the business of Omni, a competing billboard company, 
by petitioning the city council for legislation that would prohibit the construction of new 
billboards. Id. at 368. Columbia was run by a family with strong ties to the community and with 
close personal relationships with many of the city’s public officials. Id. at 367. Columbia 
provided funds and free billboard space to the council members from whom it sought this 
legislation. Id. 
 213. Id. at 383–84. 
 214. Id. at 382. 
 215. See id. 
 216. Id. at 384. 
 217. Because Omni held that a conspiracy does not preclude immunity under either doctrine, 
“a corrupt purpose to restrain competition in a state or state-authorized municipal regulatory 
program will not defeat immunity.” Bob Nichols & Eric Schmitt, Antitrust Violations, 48 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 335, 358 (2011). 
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2.  The Lack of a 
Misrepresentation Exception 
Undermines the Democratic Process 
Because the Court has left open the question of whether a fraud 
or misrepresentation exception exists, lower courts have been highly 
inconsistent in recognizing and applying the exception.
218
 The courts 
that do recognize the exception have done so on a limited basis, such 
as by recognizing the exception only in an adjudicative proceeding 
and then requiring that the misrepresentation be both intentional and 
material.
219
 Additionally, the Supreme Court has said that if such an 
exception exists, it applies only to adjudicatory petitions, not to 
administrative or legislative petitions.
220
 
Because the Court has excluded petitioning activity from the 
reach of antitrust law rather than creating an exception for petitions 
due to First Amendment concerns, the courts can and have 
immunized petitions based on intentional misrepresentations, even 
though that petitioning activity would not be protected under the 
First Amendment.
221
 This has resulted in a doctrine under which 
citizens are allowed to ask the government to suppress competition 
 
 218. United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123–24 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(declining to extend Noerr immunity where defendants falsely “publicly denied, distorted, and 
minimized the hazards of smoking for decades” because Noerr “does not protect deliberately 
false or misleading statements”); Michael v. Letchinger, No. 10 C 3897, 2011 WL 3471082, at 
*11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2011) (recognizing a “fraudulent misrepresentation” exception within the 
sham exception but granting Noerr immunity to defendants because the petition was not made in 
an adjudicative setting); see also Lao, supra note 65, at 988 (discussing different courts’ 
treatment of the exception). 
 219. See, e.g., Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 843 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(requiring that the misrepresentation be “intentionally made, with knowledge of its falsity [and] 
material, in the sense that it actually altered the outcome of the proceeding”); Cheminor Drugs, 
Ltd. v. Ethyl Corp., 168 F.3d 119, 124 (3rd Cir. 1999) (“[A] material misrepresentation that 
affects the very core of a litigant’s . . . case will preclude Noerr-Pennington immunity.”); Kottle 
v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[L]itigation can be deemed a sham if 
a party’s knowing fraud upon, or its intentional misrepresentations to, the court deprive the 
litigation of its legitimacy.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 220. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499–500 (1988); 
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Head Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). Although these 
cases indicated that misrepresentation or fraud would only preclude Noerr immunity in the 
adjudicatory context, the Court later reopened the issue in PRE. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. 
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 61 n.6. (1993). However, lower courts continue to 
apply the exception only to adjudicatory petitions. See Mercatus Grp., 641 F.3d at 844 (quoting 
language from both Allied Tube and Cal. Motor Transport). 
 221. The First Amendment does not protect petitions that are based on a misrepresentation or 
fraud. Philip Morris USA, 566 F.3d at 1123. 
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even if the information they give the government in support of that 
petition is knowingly false.
222
 For example, in Mercatus Group, LLC 
v. Lake Forest Hospital, the court gave Noerr immunity to the 
defendant’s petitions even though the petitions were based on false 
information because it found that the board considering the petitions 
was acting in a legislative rather than an adjudicative capacity and 
that the misrepresentation exception therefore did not apply.
223
 
Immunizing petitions that are based on false and fraudulent 
information fosters an abuse of the governmental process.
224
 The 
democratic process relies on accurate information to make informed 
decisions. Petitions based on false information impede the ability of 
the democratic system to work the way it is meant to work.
225
 Based 
on the foregoing, there does not appear to be any justification to 
protect this type of unethical and harmful petition. 
C.  The Parker Court’s Failure to Recognize 
the Conflict Between Antitrust Laws and Federalism Principles 
Has Left State Action Essentially Unregulated 
The Court’s choice to ignore the conflict between the principles 
of federalism and the national antitrust laws has essentially left state 
action unregulated.
226
 By holding that antitrust law does not apply in 
the area of state action, the Court has created a state action doctrine 
that is both unclear and overly broad.
227
 This choice has eroded the 
protection that antitrust law is meant to provide to the consumer.
228
 
 
 222. See Mercatus Grp., 641 F.3d at 849. 
 223. Id. In Mercatus, Mercatus Group intended to open a new physician center that would 
compete with Lake Forest Hospital. Id. at 837. In order to protect itself from this competition, the 
Hospital petitioned members of the Village Board to deny the permits and approval necessary for 
Mercatus to build its center. Id. at 837–38. The Hospital also launched a public-relations 
campaign designed to get the community to pressure the Board to stop the construction of the 
new center. Id. Mercatus claimed that the hospital, both in its petitions to the Village Board and 
its public relations campaign, “drastically misrepresented, among other things, the extent to 
which the Mercatus physician center would harm the Hospital.” Id. at 841. Mercatus alleged that 
the Hospital’s claims that it would lose $2 million, would be unable to provide charity care, and 
would ultimately go out of business was a lie. Id. All of this information, which the court 
assumed was misrepresented by the Hospital, informed the Village Board’s decision to deny 
approval for construction of Mercatus’s center. 
 224. Lao, supra note 65, at 1016. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See infra Part III.B.1–3. 
 227. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 108. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a 
case that will review the scope of the state action doctrine. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health 
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1.  Midcal Foreseeability 
Regardless of whether the foreseeability standard for 
municipalities and private actors is read broadly or narrowly, within 
the context of state action immunity generally, the standard is too 
broad.
229
 As one commentator put it, “the foreseeability standard has 
proven to be of no bite.”
230
 Unless a state specifically authorizes 
anticompetitive action, the broader the state’s grant of authority, the 
more likely a court will hold that anticompetitive conduct was 
foreseeable.
231
 If the state does not specify what type of conduct it is 
authorizing, anticompetitive conduct could almost always be a 
foreseeable result.
232
 Thus, the foreseeability standard significantly 
waters down the requirements of the first prong of the Midcal test 
and makes it much easier for a court to grant Parker immunity.
233
 
When courts immunize conduct because it was simply 
foreseeable rather than expressly authorized by the state, they are 
immunizing conduct that does not fall within the regulatory policy of 
the state. Because the state action doctrine says that the Sherman Act 
was not meant to regulate in this area, this type of conduct can be 
immunized.
234
 On the other hand, if the state action doctrine was 
bound by the guidelines of federalism, this type of conduct would 
likely not be protected because it is not the state’s clearly articulated 
policy that is being protected, but rather what the court thinks could 
logically have resulted from the state’s policy. This immunity comes 
at the expense of the consumer, who is subjected to the effects of 
anticompetitive behavior—behavior that does not actually further the 
policy of the Sherman Act or correspond to what the Court is aiming 
to protect. Without the protection of antitrust law, there would be a 
 
Sys., 663 F.3d 1369 (11th Cir. 2011, cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 4852 (U.S. June 25, 2012). 
The Court will decide whether the clear articulation and active supervision requirements are met 
in a case involving a local government entity, and it may provide some clarification to the 
doctrine. See Matthew Bush, Petition of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (May 4th, 2012, 11:43pm), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=144433. 
 228. See infra Part III.B.1–3. 
 229. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 358 (“The clear statement requirement is not 
particularly rigorous.”). 
 230. Hettich, supra note 111, at 126. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. 
 233. Id. at 127. 
 234. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
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shortage of competitors to drive down prices, and, consequently, the 
consumer would have to pay more for services. 
Many cities have exclusive contracts with utilities or cable 
companies that states do not expressly authorize but that courts 
nonetheless protect because they consider it foreseeable that the city 
would enter into these contracts when the state gives them the 
authority to regulate in these areas.
235
 Thus, the consumers—the 
residents of the city—ultimately pay more for utilities and television 
than they would otherwise because there is nobody to compete with 
the cable company or waste services provider and thus drive prices 
down. For example, in Massengale, because the Court held that it 
was foreseeable that the city would grant an exclusive contract for 
waste disposal in the wake of a state statute that authorized cities to 
manage their waste disposal, the plaintiff was required to pay for 
trash and recycling services that he did not use.
236
 This change 
resulted in an increase of the cost of waste disposal from about $1.56 
per month to $15.65 per month.
237
 
2.  Active Supervision 
The second prong of the Midcal test, the active supervision 
requirement, is as problematic as the first prong. The requirement is 
unclear and, with the exemption for municipalities, it is far too broad. 
a.  Unclear standard requires courts 
to make subjective determination 
about what is sufficient 
Because it is unclear what is sufficient to satisfy this 
requirement, it is difficult for private actors to determine whether 
they are protected by antitrust immunity.
238
 This ambiguity unfairly 
 
 235. See, e.g., Massengale v. City of Jefferson, Mo., No. 10-CV-4232-NKL, 2011 WL 
3320508, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 2, 2011); Elec. Inspectors, Inc. v. Vill. of E. Hills, 320 F.3d 110 
(2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 982 (2003) (upholding several municipalities’ grant of 
monopoly over fire inspections to the New York Board of Fire Underwriters, because other 
inspectors’ “complete exclusion from the market for required electrical inspection services [was] 
a foreseeable result of a statute that require[d] municipalities to enforce a uniform fire code”). 
 236. Massengale, 2011 WL 3320508, at *1. 
 237. Id. at *1–3. 
 238. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 640 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
(“Henceforth, a state-regulated public utility company must at its peril successfully divine which 
of its countless and interrelated tariff provisions a federal court will ultimately consider ‘central’ 
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subjects those actors to antitrust liability when they happen to guess 
wrong.
239
 Additionally, without clear standards, the reviewing court 
will inevitably impose its own judgment about whether the economic 
regulation in question is wise.
240
 Had the Court adhered to the 
principles of federalism—instead of saying that antitrust law simply 
did not apply in the context of state action—it would have developed 
a standard that required accountability by the state rather than one 
that requires courts to make determinations about the state’s 
intention or the scope of the state’s authorization.
241
 Instead, the 
standard defeats the purpose of the active supervision requirement, 
which is to ensure that the private actor is engaging in conduct that is 
deemed to be the conduct of the state itself.
242
 
b.  Misguided faith 
in municipalities 
Although the Supreme Court attempted to strengthen its 
requirements for active supervision in Ticor and some circuits do use 
a narrow definition,
243
 the Court exempted municipalities from the 
active supervision requirement, thereby creating a wide open door to 
 
or ‘imperative.’ If it guesses wrong, it may be subjected to treble damages as a penalty for its 
compliance with state law.”); see also Hettich, supra note 111, at 138 (arguing that requiring 
regulated parties to guess whether they will be protected by antitrust immunity is inherently 
unfair). 
 239. Hettich, supra note 111, at 138. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 54 
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf. The Task Force 
reported that “[t]hrough the active supervision requirement, the Court is furthering the 
fundamental principal of ‘accountability’ that underlies federalism, by ensuring that, if allowing 
anticompetitive conduct proves to be unpopular with a state’s citizens, the state’s legislators will 
not be ‘insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decisions.’” Id. While the Task Force 
Report correctly pinpoints the aims of the active supervision requirement, the doctrine currently 
fails to further the principle of accountability. See infra Part III.B. The changes to the doctrine 
suggested in this Article aim to achieve this. 
 242. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 53–54; 
Hettich, supra note 111, at 136; McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 346. 
 243. See, e.g., Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 231–32 (2d Cir. 2004) (“New 
York has failed to provide for any state supervision, much less active supervision, [having] no 
mechanism . . . whereby New York may review the reasonableness of the pricing decisions.”) 
(quotations and citation omitted)); A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 
239, 258 (3d Cir. 2001) (finding insufficient active supervision for immunity because the 
“States . . . lack oversight or authority over the tobacco manufacturers’ prices and production 
levels,” which were decided “entirely [by] the private actors”). 
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state action immunity.
244
 The Court reasoned that municipalities are 
likely to act in the public interest and that there is little risk that a 
municipality will become involved in private anticompetitive 
conduct.
245
 However, the Court’s faith in municipalities has proven 
naïve.
246
 Often, municipalities act in their own best interest, 
implementing regulations that are harmful to the consumer.
247
 Since 
there is no conspiracy exception to state action immunity, local 
politicians acting for the municipality are free to enter into 
agreements, which are harmful to the consumer and often arguably 
corrupt, without the threat of liability.
248
 The Court’s decision in 
Omni provides a striking example.
249
 There, the city council had to 
show only that anticompetitive conduct was a foreseeable result of 
the South Carolina statute that authorized municipalities to regulate 
the construction of structures within its boundaries, a condition that 
was “amply met.”
250
 Problems with the foreseeability standard aside, 
the Court never even considered whether South Carolina had actively 
supervised its grant of authority because the actor in Omni was a 
municipality.
251
 The reason for this, though not stated in Omni itself, 
is that the Court operated under the assumption that the municipality 
was acting in the best interest of the public.
252
 Yet, in reality, the 
majority owner of the billboard company was friends with many of 
the city council members and was funding their campaigns.
253
 The 
members of the city council, in protecting their friends at the 
billboard company, were acting in their own best interest rather than 
in the public interest.
254
 This type of self-interested behavior by 
 
 244. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 
 245. Id. 
 246. See William J. Martin, Comment, State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally 
Supervised Parties, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1085 (2005). 
 247. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); Active 
Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Martin, supra note 246, at 
1085 (“Despite Hallie's assurances to the contrary, municipal defendants sometimes threaten 
competition as much as private parties.”). 
 248. See, e.g., Omni, 499 U.S. at 372. 
 249. Id. For facts see supra Part II.A. 
 250. Omni, 499 U.S. at 370–73. 
 251. Id. at 390–91. 
 252. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 
 253. Omni, 499 U.S. at 367. 
 254. See id. at 368. 
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municipalities is not uncommon.
255
 Thus, the Court’s assurances in 
Hallie appear to carry little weight, and exempting municipalities 
from the active supervision requirement is actually very harmful to 
the consumer.
256
 
c.  Exemption of regulatory agencies from 
active supervision broadens state action 
beyond its intended purpose 
The Court’s exemption of municipalities from the active 
supervision requirement also impacts its treatment of nonsovereign 
subsidiaries of the state, such as regulatory boards, because courts 
have not decided whether to treat these entities more like a private 
actor or a municipality.
257
 Although the Court has addressed the 
issue, it has not clearly determined which subdivisions of the state 
should be regarded as sovereign state actors.
258
 Thus, it is not clear 
whether the state must actively supervise these nonsovereign actors. 
Further, the Court’s suggestions regarding how to treat the 
agencies are troubling. Based on a footnote in Hallie, the Court 
 
 255. Just recently, in Active Disposal, Inc. v. City of Darien, 635 F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2011), the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a regulation enacted by several Illinois municipalities whereby a person in 
need of a dumpster must use a specific company with which the municipality has an exclusive 
contract. Id. at 885. The court itself recognized that “these contracts often have a financial benefit 
for the municipality [and] also impose a cost on consumers who would prefer a different, 
probably less expensive, trash hauler.” Id. However, because active supervision is not required, 
and the court found that the anticompetitive consequences of an exclusive contract, which was 
authorized by the state, were foreseeable, state action immunity applied, and the municipalities 
were free to continue to act in their own best interest. Id. at 889. 
 256. See Martin, supra note 246, at 1085. 
 257. Compare Stratlenko v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty Hosp. Auth., No. 1:07-CV-258, 
2009 WL 736007, at *24 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 17, 2009) (requiring that “the State exercise ultimate 
control over the challenged anticompetitive conduct” before granting immunity to a hospital 
authority’s peer review committee), with Shames v. Cal. Travel & Tourism Comm’n, 607 F.3d 
611, 618–19 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d on rehearing en banc, 626 F.3d 1079 (holding that the 
California Travel and Tourism Commission was exempt from the active supervision requirement 
because it “possesse[d] enough of the qualities of a state agency.” The case was reversed and 
remanded when the Ninth Circuit reheard it en banc, but there, the court found that California had 
not authorized the anticompetitive conduct and did not address the active supervision issue.). See 
also Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1575–76 (explaining that the Coucrt has not 
determined how to treat nonsovereign subsidiaries); Hettich, supra note 111, at 117 (“[C]ase law 
does not provide clear guidance with regard to the question of which subdivisions of the state 
should be regarded as state actors.”); Hettich, supra note 111, at 134 (“There are no uniformly 
applied or even clear criteria to determine the status of these entities.”). 
 258. Hettich, supra note 111, at 134 (“While case law is still clear that private actors are 
subject to the supervision requirement, it is still unclear which hybrid or local entities are 
exempted from supervision.”). 
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seemingly would not require active supervision for state agencies,
259
 
but state agencies often act more similarly to a private party than to a 
state.
260
 If active state supervision is not required, these agencies are 
essentially free to implement their own anticompetitive regulations 
without the potential for liability.
261
 This expands Parker beyond its 
goal of preserving state sovereignty and makes the immunity too 
broad.
262
 This broadening of the doctrine frustrates antitrust 
legislation and harms the consumer by allowing the agencies to 
advance their own interests instead of the consumer’s.
263
 The Court 
has even said that it is “obvious that the fact that . . . the conscious 
desire on [a state agency’s] part may have been to benefit [private 
parties] . . . cannot transmute [the agency’s] official actions into 
those of a private organization.”
264
 Yet, if the goal of the state agency 
is to protect private parties, why should the agency be afforded the 
same leniency that municipalities are given?
265
 The purpose of the 
state action doctrine is to allow states to implement their own 
regulatory policies.
266
 Immunizing agencies that act on behalf of 
 
 259. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985); see supra II.B.1. 
 260. F.T.C. v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that state agencies may 
engage in the same activities as a private party); see also Wash. State Elec. Contractors Ass’n v. 
Forrest, 930 F.2d 736, 737 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding the case for findings on active supervision 
as well as a clearly articulated state policy after noting that the defendant rate-setting commission 
had “both public and private members, and the private members [had] their own agenda which 
may or may not be responsive to state labor policy”). 
 261. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1577–78 (arguing that active supervision for state 
agencies should be required because state agencies enact so many anticompetitive regulations, 
which they can usually find the authority for in state legislation, making a clear articulation 
requirement insufficient on its own). 
 262. Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides with Deregulation: 
Rehabilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 349, 363 (2006) 
(“The problem with the Midcal test has been that it does not necessarily advance the interests of 
the state as Parker had originally intended for state action to do.”). 
 263. See id. (“[D]elegation to regulatory agencies allows for regulated entities such as public 
utilities with close ties to the same entities regulating them to advance their own interests.”). 
 264. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 411 n.41 (1978). 
 265. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1595–96 (footnote omitted) (“Much 
anticompetitive conduct is not the result of legislation, but rather emanates from regulatory 
boards made up of decision makers who wear their regulatory hat at the board’s monthly 
meetings, but earn a living in the very profession that they have been charged to regulate the other 
353 days of the year. Given their financial self interest, there seems to be no principled reason to 
consider these actors anything but private.”). 
 266. See Timothy J. Muris, Clarifying the State Action and Noerr Exemptions, 27 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 443, 445 (2004) (“Parker stands for the proposition that the federal antitrust laws, 
and the Sherman Act in particular, were not intended to restrict the lawmaking power of state 
legislatures.”). 
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private parties, rather than the state, does nothing to advance this 
purpose. Further, while the immunized action may benefit some 
private party, surely, if it is anticompetitive, it is at the expense of 
another.
267
 Regulatory boards, such as state dental boards, state bar 
associations, or state real estate boards “acting under the guise of 
consumer protection” can implement anticompetitive regulations that 
make it more difficult for others to practice in that area.
268
 Courts 
immunize this conduct if the agency can show that the state 
authorized or foresaw this type of regulation.
269
 When this conduct is 
immunized, there is no protection for those who would otherwise 
claim that they were harmed by an antitrust violation, and the 
regulatory agencies are free to act in their own best interest at the 
expense of the consumer. 
3.  Market Participant Exception 
Another area where the Court has created uncertainty within the 
state action doctrine concerns whether there is a market participant 
exception.
270
 In Omni, the Court held that there is a “possible market 
participant exception”
271
 and that “[Parker] immunity does not 
necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity 
but as a commercial participant in a given market.”
272
 Courts have 
been left to guess whether such an exception exists.
273
 The court in 
Pennsylvania v. Susquehanna Area Regional Airport Authority
274
 
noted this uncertainty, saying that the Court “has [not] clearly 
articulated the parameters of the market participant exception.”
275
 
The court also cited two Third Circuit cases, one holding that a 
market participant exception does exist, and the other holding that it 
 
 267. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1577–78. 
 268. Id. at 1577 n.99. 
 269. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985); see supra II.B.1. 
 270. See Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1577–78. 
 271. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991) (emphasis 
added). 
 272. Id. at 374–75 (emphasis added). 
 273. See Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc. v. Morgan Cnty., Ind., 397 F. Supp. 2d 
1032, 1046 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (finding no authority or support for a market participant exception); 
see also Pennsylvania v. Susquehanna Area Reg’l Airport Auth., 423 F. Supp. 2d 472, 482 (M.D. 
Pa. 2006) (assuming a market participant exception exists, but holding that challenged activity 
did not qualify as market participation). 
 274. 423 F. Supp. 2d 472. 
 275. Id. at 482 n.16. 
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does not.
276
 The court “assume[d] recognition of the market 
participant exception [until] further clarification from the Third 
Circuit and Supreme Court” is given.
277
 
Having no market participant exception, or an unclear exception, 
makes it too easy for the state to abuse its protected regulatory power 
and favor state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises.
278
 For example, 
a municipality, without antitrust liability, could require solid waste to 
be treated at a city-run facility, rather than at competing private 
facilities.
279
 The municipality is not acting pursuant to a state policy 
but is acting as a seller of waste services.
280
 If the purpose of the 
state action doctrine is to preserve the principles of federalism and to 
respect state sovereignty, the state’s decision to act as a market 
participant should not be immunized. In that situation, the state is not 
regulating private conduct but rather acting as a private party would 
when it enters the market. Protecting a state when it is acting in this 
capacity does nothing to further the principles of federalism. 
Similarly, cities or agencies that purchase particular commodities use 
their power “to reduce prices below the competitive level, to impose 
terms and conditions on sellers, or to favor local businesses at the 
expense of out-of-state companies.”
281
 Such conduct is an abuse of 
the state’s regulatory power, and immunizing this type of state action 
thwarts the goals of antitrust law by harming the consumer. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Because the Noerr and state action doctrines are broader than is 
justified by the principles that should shape them, the Court should 
narrow the doctrines. It should do so by aligning the Noerr doctrine 
with the First Amendment and aligning the state action doctrine with 
the principles of federalism. Doing this will narrow the doctrines 
sufficiently to preserve the goals of antitrust law, but it will also still 
 
 276. Id. (quoting A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 265 n.55 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (recognizing exception) and Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2003) (no 
market participant exception)). 
 277. Id. 
 278. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 151. 
 279. See Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1077 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 280. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 150. 
 281. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 17, at 320 (footnotes omitted). 
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give deference to the underlying principles of the First Amendment 
and federalism. 
A.  Narrowing Noerr and Bringing It Within 
the Parameters of the First Amendment 
The Court should narrow Noerr—first, by clearly defining what 
a “petition” is, and second, by adopting limitations similar to those 
already placed on the First Amendment, such as a fraud exception 
and a strengthened sham exception. 
1.  The Court Should Clearly Define “Petition” 
Because Noerr is based on the First Amendment right to 
petition, the conduct that Noerr protects should align with the rights 
that the First Amendment protects.
282
 However, since the Court has 
not used First Amendment principles to define the scope of the 
doctrine, the scope of protection under Noerr is currently broader 
than is justified by the First Amendment.
283
 Thus, the Court should 
first narrow the scope of Noerr by more narrowly defining what 
constitutes a petition. Doing an analysis now to determine what is 
and is not protected by the First Amendment right to petition will 
inform where the boundaries of Noerr immunity should be drawn. 
For this reason, the Court needs to evaluate what a “petition” is and 
define the term more specifically, taking guidance from the kind of 
petitioning activity the First Amendment protects.
284
 The Court 
should start by looking at the First Amendment itself, which says, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people 
peaceably. . . to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”
285
 To qualify as a petition entitled to government 
protection, the communication must be a request to the government 
for some action.
286
 Thus, activity, such as filings with the 
 
 282. See id. at 381. 
 283. Id. at 300. 
 284. Id. at 301 (“The only reason for exempting petitioning activity is that the Constitution 
takes precedence over the antitrust laws. It follows that when the First Amendment protections of 
speech and petitioning are inapplicable, anticompetitive petitioning activity should be subject to 
antitrust liability . . . .”). 
 285. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 286. Id.; E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) 
(describing a petition as “an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular 
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government, that is not aimed at directly influencing the government 
to take a particular action should not be immunized.
287
 The Court can 
use this definition of petitioning as a framework to create boundaries 
to Noerr immunity. 
2.  The Court Should Adopt 
First Amendment Limitations 
The right to petition is not absolute.
288
 The First Amendment 
does not protect petitions that are based on fraud or 
misrepresentation.
289
 The Court has stated, “[T]here is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact.”
290
 Nor does the First 
Amendment protect petitions that are designed to harass an opponent 
rather than obtain relief.
291
 Further, the right to petition and the right 
to free speech—although distinct rights—are related and, as such, are 
subject to the same constitutional analysis.
292
 Speech that is not 
protected by the right to free speech is likewise not protected by the 
petition clause.
293
 For example, petitions that “express damaging 
falsehoods” are not protected speech according to libel law
294
 and 
 
action with respect to a law”); see also Lao, supra note 65, at 1004 (giving different definitions 
for petition). 
 287. See Lao, supra note 65, at 1007 (“The First Amendment Right of Petition mandates the 
protection of citizens’ efforts to influence governmental action. If the nature of the filing is such 
that it is primarily mechanical and does not attempt to persuade any official to do anything, it is 
not a petition, and hence, does not implicate the right of petition.”). One area where this would 
have a significant impact is in the regulation of brand-name drugs. A drug manufacturer that 
wishes to sell a new brand-name drug is required to submit a listing identifying all patents. Id. at 
993. This listing is filed in what is known as the Orange Book. Id. Where a drug company files an 
Orange Book listing, the FDA engages in no review. Id. The company does not ask the FDA for 
any particular action, yet it receives benefits from simply filing the listing. See id. at 994. Because 
the drug company does not seek specific action from the FDA, this should not be considered a 
petition, and Noerr immunity should not be given without even getting to the question of whether 
an exception applies. Id. at 1005. This type of analysis would apply anywhere communication is 
made with the government without the petitionary component. See id. at 1004–07. 
 288. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 483–85 (1985). 
 289. United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per 
curiam). 
 290. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
 291. See Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[N]either the Petition 
Clause nor the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects sham petitions, and statutes need not be 
construed to permit them.”). 
 292. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 n.11 (1985). 
 293. See McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485. 
 294. Id. at 484. 
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therefore should not be protected by Noerr either.
295
 Even beyond 
the well-known areas of the law where false statements are not 
protected by the First Amendment, such as defamation, perjury, and 
fraudulent solicitation of money, numerous federal laws restrict the 
making of false statements.
296
 Thus, Noerr should not protect these 
types of petitions. 
a.  The Court should create an exception for 
fraud and intentional misrepresentations 
Using these guidelines, the Court should implement a fraud and 
misrepresentation exception to Noerr that is separate and distinct 
from the sham exception. This exception should deny immunity to 
petitioners that make intentional misrepresentations, and it should 
apply in legislative and regulatory settings as well as in the 
adjudicatory context. The Court should create a fraud exception 
because “false speech does not advance any First Amendment 
interests.”
297
 In order to protect legitimate speech, the Court has 
offered some protection for false speech.
298
 This should hold true in 
the Noerr context. It would be antithetical to First Amendment goals 
to stifle petitions by imposing the fear of antitrust liability on 
petitioners whose claims are based on information that is not entirely 
true. Thus, only intentional misrepresentations should preclude a 
petition from immunity.
299
 However, it is potentially very dangerous 
to implement anticompetitive laws and regulations based on false 
information.
300
 Lawmakers and adjudicators rely on the petitioner for 
 
 295. Lao, supra note 65, at 1008 (discussing McDonald and arguing that “[i]f the right of 
petition is not absolute vis-à-vis libel because of that law’s competing interests, then neither 
should it be absolute vis-à-vis antitrust enforcement for the same reason”). 
 296. See Brief of Professors Eugene Volokh & James Weinstein as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 2, United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 457 (2011) (No. 11-210), 2012 WL 
6179424 (arguing that the Supreme Court should treat knowing falsehoods as an exception to 
First Amendment protection, with some limited exceptions that would prevent a chilling effect on 
true statements, and listing numerous examples of areas where the Court has upheld the 
restriction of false speech). 
 297. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1606. 
 298. Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964)). 
 299. Some commentators have argued that this concern only applies to petitions in a 
legislative setting, where people should be able to engage in open debate. See, e.g., Lao, supra 
note 65, at 1009–10. In an adjudicatory setting, petitioners must already act in accordance with 
the court or agency’s procedures. Id. Thus, the requirement that the misrepresentation be 
intentional should only apply to petitions made in a legislative setting. Id. 
 300. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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accurate information so that they can make the best-informed 
decisions.
301
 If petitions based on false information are protected, 
these governmental systems cannot function properly.
302
 Thus, the 
same protection given to false speech in the First Amendment 
context need not be given here. The only extra requirement should be 
that the fraud or misrepresentation was intentional. Beyond that, 
extra protections for false speech should not be required, because the 
danger of these laws and regulations outweighs the danger of stifling 
legitimate petitions.
303
 
b.  Intentional misrepresentations should 
not be immunized in any context 
The Court and many commentators suggest that any 
misrepresentation exception should be limited to petitions in an 
adjudicatory context.
304
 Some commentators cite evidentiary 
concerns.
305
 Others, like the Court, suggest that misrepresentations 
are inevitable and acceptable where lobbying is done in a political 
context but are not acceptable inside the courts, which require 
accuracy.
306
 However, as Part III.B.2 of this Article has discussed, 
misrepresentations in the legislative setting can be equally as harmful 
as those in an adjudicative setting.
307
 Therefore, the chilling effect of 
sanctioning misrepresentations in a legislative setting can be 
 
 301. See Lao, supra note 65, at 1016 (arguing that this is not the case in legislative 
proceedings where, because of the nature of lobbying, “some misrepresentations may be 
inevitable”). 
 302. See id. at 1016–17. 
 303. Id. at 1024 (“While it is generally true that speech restraints may deter the free flow of 
information to government, the type of petitioning that implicates anticompetitive concerns is 
typically made by business interests with an economic stake in the subject matter of the petition. 
It is reasonable to assume that their economic self-interest in the sought-after action would 
counterbalance, to some extent, the fear of immunity loss and neutralize (or minimize) the 
chilling effect.”). 
 304. See, e.g., Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1607; Lao, supra note 65, at 1016. 
 305. Cooper & Kovacic, supra note 100, at 1607. 
 306. Lao, supra note 65, at 1016. 
 307. See supra Part II.B. (discussing Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 
843 (7th Cir. 2011), where a hospital presented false information about effects of a new health 
center, and based on this information the Village Board denied approval for construction of the 
new health center). 
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adequately addressed by withholding Noerr protection only when the 
misrepresentation is intentional.
308
 
Additionally, the misrepresentation exception needs to be 
separate from the sham exception because the purpose of the sham 
exception is to keep out those who do not genuinely seek 
governmental action.
309
 If the sham exception is the only exception, 
petitioners who intentionally misrepresent their cause are not 
necessarily precluded from immunity because their petition is 
“genuine.”
310
 In fact, those employing fraud and misrepresentations 
in their petitions do likely want to obtain a particular result; 
otherwise, they would not need to lie. Furthermore, since a winning 
lawsuit is by definition not a sham,
311
 a lawsuit won based on 
misrepresentations would still be immune from liability.
312
 Thus, 
misrepresentations cannot fall within in the sham exception. 
3.  Broadening Sham to Protect the Consumer 
Finally, the sham exception needs to be broadened significantly. 
First, the Court should clarify the objective part of the test and 
specifically define what “objectively baseless” means. Using 
probable cause and the language of Rule 11 as alternative definitions 
is confusing because they have different meanings.
313
 Additionally, 
this language makes the requirement for proving a sham too 
 
 308. The District of Massachusetts recently made a similar argument in response to a claim 
that the sham exception only applies in an adjudicatory capacity. In re Prograf Antitrust 
Litigation, No. 1:11–md–2242-RWZ, 2012 WL 293850, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 1, 2012). The court 
asserted that “if the sham exception applied only to adjudicative processes, then any act of 
advocacy before a legislative or quasi-legislative body would be shrouded in carte blanche 
immunity regardless of purpose or sufficiency—even if the activity was utterly baseless, an abuse 
of process, and motivated solely to stifle competition. Such a result is inconsistent with the 
reasoning underlying the doctrine espoused in Noerr and reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court 
cases.” Id. 
 309. See Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972); E. R.R. 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). 
 310. Lao, supra note 65, at 1021–22 (“Without a separate misrepresentation exception . . . 
even litigation tainted with fraud and used as an anticompetitive tactic could be immunized under 
the Noerr doctrine, on the theory that the purpose of the litigation (fraud-tainted or not) was to 
obtain a successful judicial outcome and not merely to harass the competitor through the litigation 
process itself.”). 
 311. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5 
(1993). 
 312. Lao, supra note 65, at 1022. 
 313. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
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narrow.
314
 “Objectively baseless” should therefore mean that there is 
no reasonable expectation of success. This would help limit the 
number of petitions that Noerr immunizes. While the test would be 
strong enough to protect losing claims from automatically being 
considered a sham,
315
 it would limit the exception by denying 
immunity to those petitions that have probable cause but nonetheless 
have no reasonable expectation of success. This would strengthen the 
safeguard against claims that a petitioner intended to abuse the 
consumer through the process of petitioning rather than the result of 
the petition. 
Second, the Court should eliminate the subjective part of the 
test. Looking at whether the petition was objectively baseless serves 
a similar function as the subjective part of the test in that it keeps out 
those who petitioned for the purpose of abusing the process rather 
than obtaining a favorable result.
316
 Likely, petitioners actually 
seeking success on the merits will not bring an objectively baseless 
lawsuit. However, the objective test does not create an easy way for 
petitioners to retain immunity by showing that they wanted the result 
of the petition, as the subjective part of the test does. Thus, 
eliminating the subjective part of the test leaves an exception that is 
able to achieve its purpose—to protect against baseless lawsuits 
meant to harass opponents. Limiting the sham exception in this way 
keeps out lawsuits that are not entitled to First Amendment 
protection and that thus do not deserve immunity under Noerr.
317
 
Further, the sham exception recognizes the importance of protecting 
the petitioning process.
318
 While petitions are protected under the 
current doctrine, they cannot be protected adequately and effectively 
if people are able to abuse the system that hears and responds to 
petitions.
319
 This is another reason to broaden the sham exception.
320
 
 
 314. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 315. The Court has been concerned with a backward-looking rule whereby courts make a 
determination based on the knowledge that the petition has been unsuccessful. Prof’l Real Estate 
Investors, 508 U.S. at 60 n.5. 
 316. Lao, supra note 65, at 1025 (“If a lawsuit is already shown to be objectively baseless, the 
institution of suit itself implicitly shows a degree of lack of good faith; therefore, any further 
requirement of proof of the litigant’s subjective intent in bringing the suit is redundant.”). 
 317. Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 2006); Lao, supra note 65, at 1026. 
 318. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1972). 
 319. Lao, supra note 65, at 1015–16. 
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B.  Narrowing the State Action Doctrine 
and Aligning It with 
the Principles of Federalism 
State action immunity needs to be defined by the principles of 
federalism. The Court has made it clear that it wants to be deferential 
to the regulatory policies of the states, even where the Supremacy 
Clause would permit preemption.
321
 However, if deference is the 
goal, the Court should immunize state action that actually represents 
“the substantive principles of governance expressed in the Court’s 
respect for the role of the states in our federal system.”
322
 The 
doctrine should be defined narrowly so that it immunizes only state 
action that regulates domestic commerce, not policies implemented 
for the benefit of private parties without state guidance or review.
323
 
In order to do this, certain changes must be made to the doctrine. 
1.  Narrowing the Doctrine 
by Strengthening the 
Clear Articulation Standard 
First, the Court must strengthen the clear articulation standard 
by requiring more than foreseeability.
324
 In Cantor v. Detroit Edison 
Co.,
325
 the Court held that state action should be immunized from 
 
 320. Id. (“The need to protect government decision-making from corruption and abuse 
militates against too narrow an interpretation of sham.”). 
 321. This reflects a general attitude of the Supreme Court toward state sovereignty in the last 
few decades. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 191–98 
(2011). Justice Stevens criticizes the Rehnquist Court for its expansion of state sovereignty. Id. 
Rehnquist operated under the assumption that “when a state acts as a state in the conduct of 
governmental functions . . . the federal power is not supreme.” Id. at 192 (discussing Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 823 (1976), which was later 
overturned, but which, according to Stevens, shaped the way Rehnquist treated state sovereignty 
in later cases). Stevens criticizes this view and the way that Rehnquist used it to expand the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 195. 
 322. McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 299. In Justice Stevens’ view, the current view 
of state sovereignty is far too broad. Id. He argues that “[d]epriving a state of the mysterious right 
to protect its dignity from its own citizens is . . . necessary to protect the federal rights of those 
citizens.” STEVENS, supra note 321, at 196. The current application of the state action doctrine 
seems to comport with the Court’s broad grant of sovereignty to the fifty states. While this Article 
proposes that the state action doctrine may be restricted in a way that does not conflict with the 
principles of federalism, the Court may first have to narrow its broad view of state sovereignty 
before it is willing to make these types changes. 
 323. See STEVENS, supra note 321, at 196. 
 324. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 51. 
 325. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). 
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antitrust liability only to the extent necessary to make the state’s act 
work.
326
 The Court should return to its holding in Cantor as a guide 
to narrowing the doctrine. To determine whether anticompetitive 
conduct comes within the purview of a state’s policy, courts should 
inquire whether the state actually authorized the specific 
anticompetitive conduct. In 2001, the FTC created a State Action 
Task Force (the “Task Force”) to look into the state of the 
doctrine.
327
 In 2003, the Task Force issued a report in which it 
concluded that courts applied the doctrine in a way that threatened 
competition, and it recommended a narrowing of the doctrine to 
“help ensure that robust competition continues to protect 
consumers.”
328
 With respect to the clear articulation standard, the 
Task Force recommended, as does this Article, that courts find both 
that the state authorized the specific conduct and that the state has 
adopted a policy to displace competition in the manner at issue.
329
 
This two-part test should mandate that the state actually intended the 
anticompetitive result.
330
 Some scholars, even while arguing that the 
clear articulation standard needs to be narrowed, have said that the 
courts can still use the foreseeability standard to determine whether 
the state’s policy to displace competition includes the conduct in 
question as long they narrowly construe it to the specific conduct at 
issue.
331
 However, it seems that the foreseeability standard is too 
easy to stretch to the point that it no longer has any teeth, which 
results in a return to the current state of the doctrine.
332
  
Still, requiring the state to expressly point to which areas it 
intends its policy to extend seems too burdensome. Thus, the Court 
should create certain guidelines that could be used to determine 
whether a state policy included the conduct at issue. Courts could 
look at the legislative history of the policy, the actual language of the 
statute, and other conduct that the state may expressly authorize.
333
 
 
 326. Id. at 596 n.34; see also Hettich, supra note 111, at 127 (discussing Cantor and clear 
articulation standard). 
 327. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 51. 
 328. Id. at 1. 
 329. Id. at 51. 
 330. See id. 
 331. See Trujillo, supra note 262, at 356. 
 332. See supra Part B.1. 
 333. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 51 n.220. 
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While this looks somewhat similar to the foreseeability standard, a 
case-by-case analysis using set factors would ensure that courts take 
a careful look at what the state’s policy authorizes, rather than just 
concluding that the policy could foreseeably include the conduct at 
issue. Additionally, requiring the state to expressly authorize the 
conduct would eliminate state action immunity where the court finds 
only a general regulatory scheme to displace competition rather than 
authorization of the specific conduct.
334
 This approach narrows the 
doctrine enough to protect consumers from anticompetitive conduct 
where the state neither intended nor authorized the conduct. 
However, the approach still protects the underlying goal of the state 
action doctrine—that antitrust law is deferential to state regulatory 
policy, as long as that policy is clearly articulated and specifically 
intends to displace competition in the particular area at issue. 
2.  Narrowing the State Action Doctrine 
by Strengthening the 
Active Supervision Requirement 
Second, the Court should create clear guidelines that strengthen 
what is sufficient for active supervision. The ultimate purpose of the 
active supervision requirement is to grant antitrust immunity to 
private actors only when the private actor is engaging in conduct 
deemed to be the conduct of the state itself.
335
 To start, the Court 
should require the state to actually engage in some level of 
supervision.
336
 Next, the Court should require that the actor show 
that the state, not the private actor, is responsible for the 
anticompetitive conduct. Some commentators have argued for a 
sliding-scale approach, by which the Court would look at the entity 
engaging in the anticompetitive conduct, and the conduct itself, to 
 
 334. See id. at 50–52. 
 335. See id. at 53–54. 
 336. This is what the court held in Ticor. F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 637–38 
(1992). However, that case has been applied narrowly and only to very extreme situations, 
because the court found that there was no supervision there at all. Id. at 638; see also Hettich, 
supra note 111, at 137–38 (explaining that Ticor only clarified the active supervision requirement 
for extreme cases); REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 37 (noting 
that Ticor provided little if any specific guidance about what constitutes active supervision). Still, 
this should be the starting point for all active supervision analyses. 
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determine how strictly it should apply this standard.
337
 However, 
such an approach would be hard to administer and would be very 
similar to the existing test, where courts make subjective 
determinations about what qualifies as sufficient supervision. Thus, 
to determine whether the actor made a sufficient showing of 
responsibility, courts should look at certain factors, including 
whether the state 
has ascertained the relevant facts, examined the substantive 
merits of the private action, assessed whether the private 
action comports with the underlying statutory criteria 
established by the state legislature, and squarely ruled on 
the merits of the private action in a way sufficient to 
establish the challenged conduct as a product of deliberate 
state intervention rather than private choice.
338
 
Furthermore, the Court should reverse its holding in Hallie and 
require active supervision for municipalities, using these same 
guidelines. While the Court has held that municipalities 
presumptively serve the public interest, it is clear that too often this 
is not the case.
339
 Under the current doctrine, local politicians, acting 
on behalf of municipalities, are able to conspire with constituents 
who have something to offer them.
340
 This result undermines the 
Court’s reasoning and suggests that state supervision of local 
officials is necessary. Likewise, the Court should treat nonsovereign 
subsidiaries of the state as private parties rather than state actors and 
should require active supervision for these entities as well. One 
option is for the courts to first determine whether the activities of the 
regulatory board or other subdivision of the state are essentially that 
of a private party by looking at “how the Board functions in practice, 
 
 337. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 147 (discussing a “tiered approach to determine 
immunity, as favored by” John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: 
Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1089–90 (2005)). 
 338. REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 54. The Task Force also 
recommended implementing procedural guidelines, which would require that the private actor 
show that the state had developed a factual record, had made an assessment about how the private 
action comported with these standards, and had put that in a written decision. Id. at 55. 
 339. See supra Part III.C.2.b. 
 340. See supra Parts III.B.1.c, III.C.2.b. 
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and . . . the role played by its [private] members.”
341
 However, courts 
could more easily administer a bright-line rule that requires active 
supervision. Additionally, requiring the state to actively supervise the 
municipalities and regulatory agencies that are implementing its 
regulatory policies would ensure that these bodies were acting in 
accordance with the state’s policies.
342
 While this may create extra 
work for the states, it will incentivize them to think carefully about 
the anticompetitive policies they wish to enact.
343
 If the state does 
not want to implement its own policy, it will have to actively 
supervise any party that does.
344
 This requirement creates a higher 
bar for immunity. Additionally, it would “[]focus the inquiry on the 
relevant question of whether in a given case there actually are 
deliberate and intended state policies that would justify setting aside 
national antitrust goals.”
345
 Further, this approach does not encroach 
on the principles of federalism, because any policy that is actually 
authorized and supervised by the state will still be protected.
346
 
3.  Implementing Market Participant 
and Conspiracy Exceptions 
Finally, the Court should implement market participant and 
conspiracy exceptions to state action immunity. When a state 
government enters the market to buy or sell goods in competition 
with private firms, it acts as a market participant.
347
 When the state 
creates a monopoly or acts in an otherwise anticompetitive way in 
this capacity, it simply acts to exclude its own competition.
348
 
Because the state is no different from any private actor in this 
situation, in the sense that it is acting as any other buyer or seller of 
goods rather than regulating the market, its anticompetitive conduct 
 
 341. F.T.C. v. Monahan, 832 F.2d 688, 690 (1st Cir. 1987); see also REPORT OF THE STATE 
ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 55 (listing “laundry list of factors” currently used to 
determine whether the state must actively supervise a quasi-governmental entity). 
 342. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 54. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 52. 
 346. See id. 
 347. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 320. 
 348. Id. 
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should not be immunized.
349
 There are already other areas of the law 
where the Court has created an exception for states acting as a 
market participant.
350
 For example, there is a market participant 
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause.
351
 Action that 
“constitute[s] a direct state participation in the market” is immune 
from the Dormant Commerce Clause, but regulatory action is not.
352
 
There is no reason why this exception should not extend to antitrust 
cases as well. 
The State Action Task Force recognized that “a state may elect 
to allow market participation by municipalities.”
353
 However, this 
just underscores the need for municipalities to be subject to the 
active supervision requirement.
354
 Creating a market participant 
exception, which would subject states and municipalities to antitrust 
liability for acting anticompetitively, would protect those that the 
state or municipality competes against. 
Further, adding a conspiracy exception to Parker would 
eliminate the opportunity for states to abuse their regulatory 
immunity by entering into conspiracies with private parties.
355
 
Because the current state of the doctrine fosters corruption within the 
political system,
356
 a conspiracy exception is needed to prevent 
corrupt agreements between state actors and individuals. A 
conspiracy exception would also bolster the market participant 
 
 349. Hettich, supra note 111, at 150 (“There is no reason to treat states differently from 
private actors if a state is becoming a participant in a private agreement or in a combination with 
others to restrain trade.”). 
 350. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 477 U.S. 429 (1980) (recognizing the market participant 
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause where state entered the market as a seller); Hughes 
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (recognizing the market participant exception to 
the Dormant Commerce Clause where the state entered market as a purchaser). 
 351. A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 265 n.55 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 352. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town 
of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997) and New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 
(1988)). 
 353. REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 57. 
 354. See id. A municipality’s action as a market participant should not be immunized because 
the municipality’s actions are likely in their own best interest rather than the public’s when they 
act as a competitor in the market. Id. 
 355. See Hettich, supra note 111, at 151. Hettich argues that when the state enters the market 
as a competitor, its role as a market participant creates a conflict of interest with its role as a 
regulator. Id. Creating a conspiracy exception along with a market participant exception will close 
the door on the states’ ability to abuse their regulatory power. Id. 
 356. See supra Parts III.B.1.c, III.C.2.b. 
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exception by treating such conspiracies as private action rather than 
state action.
357
 These exceptions would not take away from the 
necessary deference required by federalism, because in this situation, 
the state is acting as a private party and thus is owed no deference.
358
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts and scholars today recognize that the First Amendment 
right to petition is the basis for the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and 
that federalism is the root of the state action doctrine.
359
 However, 
these two doctrines have evolved far beyond what the First 
Amendment and federalism require. This departure can be traced to 
the Court’s holdings that petitioning and state action were 
“essentially dissimilar” from what antitrust legislation was designed 
to regulate. Contrary to the Court’s decisions, antitrust law is and 
should be concerned with regulating petitioning and state action.
360
 
The doctrines in their current states are immunizing anticompetitive 
conduct that is very harmful to the consumer and that neither the 
First Amendment nor the principles of federalism protect. 
Consumers are left without the protection of antitrust law and end up 
paying far more than they should for goods and services. While these 
important constitutional protections deserve deference, the consumer 
is being harmed in the name of that deference by doctrines that do 
not align with what these principles require. Thus, the Court should 
narrow the reach of Noerr and Parker. By acknowledging that these 
doctrines concern constitutional protections and abandoning the 
notion that the Sherman Act simply does not apply in these contexts, 
the Court can use the First Amendment and federalism to define the 
 
 357. Hettich, supra note 111, at 151. 
 358. See REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 241, at 1 (“Because the 
state action doctrine rests on principles of federalism, the doctrine shields sovereign activities of 
the State itself.” (emphasis added)). 
 359. See, e.g., Mercatus Grp., LLC v. Lake Forest Hosp., 641 F.3d 834, 841–42 (7th Cir. 
2011) (explaining that the First Amendment protects the right of people to try to persuade the 
government that monopoly is preferable to the policy of the Sherman Act); In re Flonase 
Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 300, 309 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (recognizing Noerr as a First 
Amendment doctrine); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 372 (1991) 
(recognizing that Parker is designed to protect the interests of federalism). 
 360. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 27, at 293 (“[P]etitioning and state action present 
precisely the sorts of problems with which the antitrust laws are concerned—exploitation of 
consumers through the charging of supracompetitive prices.”). 
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outer limits of Noerr and Parker. This will afford more protection to 
the consumer and can be done without sacrificing the individual’s 
right to petition or detracting from a state’s sovereignty. 
 
